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The shadow economy, which is sometimes referred to as the underground or the hidden economy among a number of other terms, 
remains quite a controversial topic in economics research. This paper presents current research on the shadow economy. In the 
empirical section I study the effect of a tax policy change in the construction industry.  
 
Loosely the shadow economy can be defined as the combination of both legal and illegal transactions, both monetary and non 
monetary, that contribute to the gross national product but are unregistered. Thus the definition includes but is not limited to 
prostitution, drug dealing as well as manufacturing, and tax evasion. Companies that deal in legal goods and services, but fail to 
report their transactions and incomes to the tax authorities, can mean a loss of tax revenue for the government. However these 
losses are easy to overestimate. Even though the shadow economy clearly can have many undesirable effects on society, some of 
the estimates may be influenced by external or political factors. 
 
The literature review presents commonly used methods for estimating the shadow economy and why some of them should be 
avoided. In addition I present current estimates of the shadow economy of Finland. I also discuss the implications of recent tax gap 
estimations by the IMF. 
 
In the empirical section I attempt to estimate the effect of a reverse Value-Added Tax (VAT) policy reform in the construction 
industry on reported revenue and deductions in periodic tax returns. I use an autoregressive model with exogenous variables. 
Assume that the reform is discovered to have had an effect on reported revenue and/or deductions. Then the possible difference 
between an increase in reported revenue and deductions could be interpreted as an increase of the tax base in the industry. 
Finnish Tax Administration have hypothesized in 2012 that reported revenues may have increased after the reform.  
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that reported revenues have increased after the reform. In addition I estimate the difference between an estimate that includes the 
dummy and one that does not. However this method does not appear to be feasible for studying the effect of the dummy. 
 
My data set is a collection of monthly observations of reported revenue by industry starting from 01/1999 and ending in 09/2015. 
The variable I am interested in is called lv Kotimaa (previously vermyper) which is a sum of all taxable revenue in Finland. It 
includes sales at di↵erent VAT rates as well as sales that are subjected to the reverse VAT (lv RakenPalvMyynti). I have restricted 
my analysis to the sector S11 i.e. the private sector for simplicity. The data was aggregated from actual periodic tax returns. 
 
No evidence to support the hypotheses that reported revenue or deductions have increased after the reform is discovered. The 
dummy is discovered to be a significant explanatory variable in Civil Engineering at the 90% confidence level. However the Chow 
test of structural change is highly significant for break points in early 2011. This suggests that the model is unreliable due to a 
structural change in the time series. No systematic prediction errors of reported revenue are discovered using the pure 
autoregressive model.  
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Piilotalous on kiistanalainen tutkimuskohde taloustieteen alalla. Tämä tutkielma esittelee aiheeseen liittyvää kirjallisuutta ja tutkii 
veromuutoksen mahdollisia vaikutuksia piilotalouteen rakennusalalla.  
 
Piilotalous voidaan määritellä transaktioiksi, jotka kontribuoivat bruttokansantuotteeseen, mutta niitä ei havaita tilastoissa. 
Piilotalouden osia ovat sekä harmaa- että laiton talous. Valtio voi menettää verotuloja niiden yritysten kohdalla, jotka myyvät 
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Tutkin ilmiön vaikutusta tarkastelemalla dummy-muuttujan merkitsevyyttä. Dummy kuvaa käänteisen arvonlisäverovelvollisuuden 
käyttönottoa huhitkuusta 2011 alkaen. Lisäksi estimoin aikasarjamallilla ilmoitettuja liikevaihtoja ja vertaan ennustetta toteutuneisiin 
ilmoituksiin. Jos malli tuottaa systemaattisen posiitivisen ennustevirheen, voidaan ajatella, että liikevaihdot ovat mahdollisesti 
kasvaneet veromuutoksen jälkeen. Lisäksi tutkin kahden sovitteen eroa, joista toinen sisältää dummy-muuttujan. Vaikuttaa 
kuitenkin, että tämä metodi ei sovellu dummyn vaikutuksen tarkasteluun. 
 
Käytössä oleva data on kuukausittaisia havaintoja alkaen tammikuusta 1999 ja päättyen lokakuuhun 2015. Luvut ovat aggregoitu 
kuukausitasolle kausiveroilmoituksista. Muuttuja lv_Kotimaa sisältää veronalaisen myynnin eri arvonlisäverokannoilla sekä 
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1 Introduction
The shadow economy, which is sometimes referred to as the underground or the hidden economy among
a number of other terms, remains quite a controversial topic in economics research. We still do not
have a universally accepted definition for the phenomenon and estimates for e.g. Finland range from
circa 1.5 % of GDP to over 15 % of GDP (Viren 2013). This paper presents current research on the
shadow economy. In the empirical section I study the effect of a tax policy change in the construction
industry. In addition I discuss the implications of recent research on the size of the shadow economy
of Finland.
Loosely the shadow economy can be defined as the combination of both legal and illegal transactions,
both monetary and non-monetary, that contribute to the gross national product but are unregistered
(Schneider and Enste 2000). Thus the definition includes but is not limited to prostitution, drug
dealing plus manufacturing, and tax evasion. Typically the definition used includes both the illegal
economy and what we call the grey economy in Finnish. The definition that has been used by OECD
(2002) is called the Non-Observed Economy, which also includes household production for their own
use.
Consultants to the Parliament of Finland Hirvonen et al. (2010) produced a report on the shadow
economy of Finland, where they defined the shadow economy as wages not reported to the tax author-
ities, which they call the fiscal shadow economy. Their definition includes capital gains not reported to
the tax authorities, which they argue others do not. A number of other criticisms towards the report
and its results have been raised by economists in Finland.
The Hirvonen et al. (2010) report and its methods have been heavily criticized by e.g. Viren (2013),
who argues that since they aggregate the results of clearly non-random tax audits to the whole economy,
the results are significantly overestimated due to selection bias. It is probably the case that if they had
included the illegal economy in their estimates, the estimate would have been even higher. However it
should be noted that some of the differences can possibly be explained with the fact that this report
includes untaxed capital gains in their estimations, which are typically not included. OECD (2002)
states that capital gains tax evasion is by definition not a productive activity and thus it is not included
in the GDP.
There are plenty of reasons for economists to be interested in the shadow economy. Companies that
deal in legal goods and services, but fail to report their transactions and incomes to the tax authorities,
mean a loss of tax revenue for the government (Schneider and Enste 2000). However these losses are
easy to overestimate.
This is partly because operating margins in fields that are typically associated with a high degree of
informality, such as construction and restaurants, are on the low side. Thus even a small increase in
costs would likely drive many of the affected businesses to bankruptcy (Viren 2015).
Schneider and Enste (2000) argue that one strategy for the government to try to decrease the size
of the shadow economy is to introduce new regulation. Logically this can mean challenges for the
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companies that comply with regulations and this increase in regulation can lead to less choice and/or
higher prices for the consumers.
Additionally people employed in the shadow economy can cause a strain on the welfare system and
decrease labour market participation. Imagine that someone is earning unreported income in distri-
bution of drugs or working in construction. Because this income is unreported and thus does not exist
in the eyes of the unemployment office, this person can keep on claiming social security benefits while
earning an income. This means that the true income of a person working in the shadow economy is
higher than just the benefits they are receiving.
Thus taking a position in the formal economy might actually decrease his/her income even if the job
pays more than the unemployment benefits are. This clearly creates bad incentives in the labour
market. Also labour market laws are most likely not very well enforced in the shadow economy and
there is potential for exploitation of labour in workplaces that do not comply with regulations.
In addition to labour market violations, a high shadow economy can also increase crime in other areas
of society. Because participants in the shadow economy cannot turn to the judiciary system to settle
their disagreements or increase marketing in order to capture more market share, they have to turn to
violence (Miron 2012). Miron also argues that since people are breaking the law by dealing in illegal
goods and services, the threshold for breaking other laws is reduced, since these people are already
breaking the law to begin with.
Even though the shadow economy clearly can have many undesirable effects on society, some of the
estimates may be influenced by external or political factors. Tanzi (1999), who incidentally is one of
the earliest contributors to the field and has since become very critical of the large estimates produced
by methods he himself has brought forward, has written about such incentives and how some of them
are relevant for European countries.
Countries in the European Union (EU) may have an incentive to overestimate their GDP in order
to meet the Maastricht Criteria with regards to budget deficits and debt-to-GDP ratio. 1 Countries
might also want to underestimate their shadow economy and thus their GDP in order to lower their
financial contributions to the EU, which are based on the size of the countries’ GDPs (Tanzi 1999).
In addition the Stability and Growth Pact of the EU limits the size of public debt in relation to a
country’s annual GDP. Thus if a given country estimates their shadow economy to be relatively large,
then ceteris paribus this will decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio of that country. The estimated shadow
economy is added on top of observed production in the national accounts since they are included in
the production boundary and thus the GDP (ESA 2010).
There are other political incentives to promote a high estimate of the shadow economy. Takala and
Viren (2012) write that politicians could promise that instead of cutting public services, the fiscal deficit
in e.g. Finland could be brought down by assigning more resources to decreasing the shadow economy.
This is based on the assumption that there exists significant unreported production in the economy
1The Maastricht Criteria are five economic criteria set in 1992 that an EU member state is required to comply with
i.a. in order to join the Eurozone
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that the government could start taxing if only they had the resources to do so. If the lawmakers make
decisions based on a potentially biased estimate produced with an inappropriate method, they can end
up misdirecting scarce resources and promoting potentially harmful economic policies that can have
long-lasting effects on the national economy.
Banks and credit card companies have an incentive to promote high estimates as well. The government
could start to discourage cash use in order to hamper shadow economic activity, which banks naturally
hope will mean an increase in cash deposits. Credit card companies like VISA even fund some of
the research on shadow economy, such as Schneider and A. T. Kearney (2013), because they would
naturally like to see an increase in credit card usage. The logic here is that cash is being used to fund
transactions in the shadow economy and thus reducing cash use is beneficial for society.
Overall the topic remains controversial. Comparing different estimates is troublesome, because of
a variety of definitions being used and the huge differences in results due to the different methods
available to researchers.
This paper reviews recent literature on the topic and defines the shadow economy as productive
activities that are included in the production boundary of national accounts as defined by ESA (2010).
Activities such as theft or capital gains tax evasion are not productive activities and as such are not
included in the production boundary.
The literature review in section 2 discusses in detail why certain popular econometric methods are
not appropriate for estimating the shadow economy of Finland. There are other methods available as
well, but these two have been used a lot and thus are discussed here. These indirect methods and the
estimates they produce have been under heavy criticism (see e.g. Tanzi 1999; Breusch 2005; Ahumada
et al. 2007; Ahumada et al. 2008; Takala and Viren 2010). In fact OECD (2002) has suggested that
such methods should be disregarded as unreliable.
The issue of tax compliance is also discussed in the literature review. When the tax rate of a given
good or service changes, a company not declaring the right amount of taxes can sometimes be an
honest mistake instead of being purposeful in order to hide economic activity. Through this example
I also introduce some of the more recent papers like Kosonen and Ropponen (2013) that study tax
compliance using field experiments.
In section 3 I review some of the most recent estimates for Finland in more detail. In addition I
perform fresh calculations on the percentage of shadow economic activity in Finland by industry. I
discuss new tax gap estimations by the IMF and the Finnish Tax Administration Vero. While these
estimations are inherently uncertain, my argument is that since these estimations are being done by
the IMF and they are at the disposal of economists, the use and applications of the potential VAT
estimates should be studied further. The same argument was brought forward by Erard (2002) with
regards to operational audit data collected by tax administrations.
In sections 4 to 6 I attempt to estimate the effect of the reverse Value-Added Tax (VAT) policy reform
in the construction industry on reported revenue and deductions in periodic tax returns. Imagine
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that the reform is discovered to have had an effect on reported revenue and/or deductions. Then the
possible difference between the increase in reported revenue and deductions could be interpreted as an
increase of the tax base in the industry. I use monthly time series data aggregated from periodic tax
returns in the construction industry. In section 7 I discuss the implications of my findings and section
8 concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
This section covers methods that have been previously used or could be used for studying the shadow
economy. I describe a method of using operational audit data for extrapolating whole population
estimates of tax noncompliance. This method requires the use of operational audit data collected by
tax administrations, which may be difficult to obtain. However since operational audit data flow is
continuous, this may be the most promising method available at present.
2.1 Commonly used methods
2.1.1 The currency method
One of the commonly used method for estimating the size of the shadow economy is called the currency
method. This method assumes that transactions in the shadow economy are paid using cash. In order to
estimate the size of the shadow economy, one must first estimate the demand for cash after accounting
for all official registered transactions in the economy.
Schneider and Enste (2000) present the regression for estimating the demand for currency in its basic
form as:
ln(C/M2) = β0 + β1ln(1 + TW )t + β2ln(WS/Y )t + β3lnRt + β4ln(Y/N) + ut (1)
where β1 > 0, β2 > 0, β3 < 0, β4 < 0.
In the above equation C/M2 denotes the amount of cash holdings relative to M2
2, TW is the weighted
average tax rate, WS/Y is the share of wages and salaries and national income Y , R signifies interest
paid for savings deposits, and finally Y/N is per capita national income.
The idea of the currency method is that the demand for currency, i.e. the increase of cash in circulation,
that cannot explained by the above equation, is assumed to go into transactions in the shadow economy.
Then by simply multiplying that number with the velocity of money, which is typically assumed to be
equal for both the shadow and the official economy, one obtains the size of the shadow economy.
2M2 is the amount of cash in circulation plus non-interest bearing bank deposits, cheques etc.
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This method has been under a lot of criticism. For example Thomas (1999) points out that the most
problematic assumption that needs to be made in order for the method to work is that a year must
be chosen when the shadow economy was zero and all currency was demanded for transactions in the
legal economy.
This same problem was later pointed out by Ahumada et al. (2008), who refer to the assumption as the
problem of initial conditions. They argue that the only way to get rid of the need for initial conditions
is base all estimations on long-run estimates for cash demand. Nonetheless the method remains very
problematic.
This assumption of initial conditions does appear to be unrealistic. It implies that in some period in
the past we inexplicably experienced extremely large growth of the shadow economy from 0 % of GDP
to some number > 0 % of GDP and that there was a time in the past when the shadow economy was
nonexistent. Thomas (1999) also points out that a proportion of the currency demand should go into
savings and not all demanded currency is in fact spent.
Thomas (1999) demonstrates the problem of initial conditions through an example of a study on the
unobserved economy of the UK by Fiege (1981). In this study the base year is 1960 and thus it implies
that in 1960 the shadow economy was 0 % of GDP, which then grew to around 6 % of GDP in 1961,
reached its peak in 1974 at 22 % of GDP before falling back to 14 % of GDP in 1975. The problem,
according to Thomas, is that it is extremely unlikely that such fluctuations in the economy could go
unnoticed and he asks what is the implication for policy makers.
Takala and Viren (2010) list multiple reasons that could explain the recent increase in cash demand
in the eurozone that have little to do with the shadow economy. First of all since we have experienced
a period of low interest rates, cash could simply have become a more appealing asset, because it has
a lower opportunity cost than if interest rates were higher.
They also argue that the financial crisis that started in 2008 has led to cash flight from banks. Other
reasons include the fact that not all households in the eurozone have access to banking services and
the fact that cross-border trade has increased and some of it occurs in cash. Additionally the eurozone
is particularly affected by currency substitution 3 (Takala and Viren 2010).
Ahumada et al. (2007) argue that within the currency method there are internal inconsistencies that
stem from the velocity of money assumption. They write that this assumption is only valid if income
elasticity for cash demand equals one. Thus estimations produced with the currency method implicitly
assume that this elasticity indeed equals one. Breusch (2005a) on the other hand has argued that this
velocity is assumed to be too high and that if an appropriate value was used, the estimates would
decrease significantly.
3This means that the Euro is being used as a medium of exchange outside the eurozone.
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2.1.2 The MIMIC method
Another popular method is called the structural equation method or the MIMIC (Multiple Indicator
Multiple Cause) method. In this method there are two kinds of observed variables; ”causal and
indicator, which are connected by an unobserved shadow economy index” (Breusch 2005b).
Both of these models can be generally referred to as indirect methods that try to estimate the shadow
economy using a single model. These methods ”tend to produce spectacularly high measures, which
attract much attention from politicians and newspapers” (OECD 2002).
One paper that presents the MIMIC method in detail and uses it to estimate the shadow economy of
Portugal from 1977 to 2004 is Dell’Anno (2007). His model contains two indicator variables and six
cause variables. The model can be written as:
η = α+ γ1X1 + γ2X2 + γ3X3 + γ4X4 + γ5X5 + γ6X6 + ζ (2)
where η is the shadow economy index i.e. the latent variable and Xq are the six cause variables that
are explained in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The MIMIC Model (Dell’Anno 2007)
As Figure 1 explains the two indicator variables are real GDP Y1 and labour force participation Y2.
They are defined as:
Y1 = δ1 + λ1η + 1 (3)
and
Y2 = δ2 + λ2η + 2 (4)
For a more detailed explanation on the reasoning behind these cause variables were chosen and further
definitions please refer to Dell’Anno (2007) pp. 258-263.
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The MIMIC method has been heavily criticized by Breusch (2005a, 2005b). The method has its origins
in psychometrics and Breusch (2005b) argues that agents in the shadow economy, unlike participants
in a psychometric study, have a clear incentive to cover up their actions in order to avoid detection.
This makes the activity extremely difficult to measure.
Additionally Breusch (2005a) writes that since the size of the shadow economy must be a well defined
number i.e. illegal income has to be measured the same way as legal income, there is no room for
interpretation or scaling estimates up or down, which makes the method unfit for purpose.
In the case of Dell’Anno (2007) the indicator variables Y1 and Y2 are supposed to measure the same
latent variable η that are then scaled up, which is not possible given the characteristics described
above. It also appears to be the case that the method requires the indicator variables, like real GDP,
and the cause variables, such as the unemployment rate, are only related to each other through the
shadow economy index, which seems highly unlikely (Breusch 2005b).
The MIMIC method is more or less a more complex version of the currency method. Both of these
methods attempt to estimate a very complicated phenomenon using a single model and/or index and
should generally be avoided (OECD 2002). Likewise both methods produce intuitively high estimates
at least in the case of Finland (Viren 2013). Thus based on the extensive critique reviewed above,
both methods are rejected for the purposes of this paper.
2.1.3 Direct estimation methods
The shadow economy could also be estimated with direct methods such as surveys or field experiments,
which have their fair share of problems. Clearly there are a multitude of problems with surveys that
ask questions about illegal activities. Participants have an incentive to lie and are generally thought to
be reluctant to share information about laws that they have themselves broken (Schneider and Enste
2000).
Challenges in conducting surveys are related to formulating the questions so that the anonymous
participants would not have to reveal any self-incriminating details. For the purposes of this paper
such surveys are also disregarded due to time and resource constraints. Field experiments are a very
appealing method and could provide very interesting results in the near future (Kosonen and Ropponen
2013), but the same resource constraints apply with regards to this paper.
Statistics Netherlands have studied the supply of labour in the underground sector using a mixed-mode
survey, which means that a combination of face-to-face, online, telephone, and paper questionnaires
were conducted. Face-to-face questionnaires had the best response rate at 61 % and also the largest
share of respondents that admitted to having done undeclared work at 7.6 %. However face-to-
face surveys were discontinued presumably due to the high costs of performing them and Statistics
Netherlands continued to use online questionnaires.
The unrecorded wages captured by this survey sum up to 435 million euro, which is circa 0.1 % of
GDP or 0.2 % of net household income. However no incomes of over 10000 euro were reported, which
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very likely implies that the estimate is downward biased. Out of 16-25 year olds 19.3 % admitted to
having undeclared activities, while for 65-year-olds the number was 0 %.
Interestingly claiming social benefits was not one of the most commonly stated reasons for doing hidden
work. 2.4 % of respondents stated claiming social benefits as a factor. This is contradiction to what
I wrote earlier. The fact that one can lose their social benefits if they start work could lead to bad
incentives in entering the official job market. However it is possible that this result is explained by
differences in the social benefit structure between say the Netherlands and Finland. Or perhaps that
the respondents do not have an incentive to answer truthfully.
The most common reasons were needing more disposable income (12 %) and wages being higher in
the underground sector (20 %). Also 30 % of respondents stated that they would do hidden work
if given the chance. The incidence was particularly high among young males working in a technical
job or working in restaurants, hotels, and cafes. The perceived probability of getting caught was
unsurprisingly an important factor in doing hidden work. If people believe there is small chance of
getting caught they are more likely to participate in unlawful activities and vice versa.
Conducting field experiments or surveys can give valuable information on the causes of shadow econ-
omy. Kosonen (2014) argues that in fact the most important thing to know about the shadow economy
is in fact not the absolute size. What we should focus on is where such activity is taking place, what
it causes, and what could potentially be done to prevent it. Knowing these things would allow us to
target resources of tax audits and policy reforms better.
2.1.4 National accounts approach
OECD (2002) describes how hidden activity can be measured from the national accounts using different
indicators. The possible methods can be roughly divided into five subcategories; supply based, labour
input, demand based, income based, and the commodity flow method. Additionally there are different
industry specific methods available for researchers.
Generally this process is rather complex and many factors need to be taken into account (OECD
2002). Schneider and Enste (2000) argue that with regards to studying the difference between the
expenditure and income measures in the national accounts, the problem is that these are typically not
measured perfectly. According to them this makes estimates produced by such methods unreliable.
However since estimating the shadow economy is by definition measuring something that is not directly
observed, surely all methods available produce estimates with a high degree of uncertainty.
One such method was employed by the IMF (2015) in their attempts to estimate the Value-Added Tax
Gap of Finland. Using data from a variety of sources including statistical input-out tables maintained
by Statistics Finland and customs transaction data, they estimate the potential and actual VAT of
Finland. These results can also be used to estimate unreported revenue in different industries as
indicated by the VAT gap estimations. I cover the VAT gap more extensively in section 2.4.
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2.2 Using operational audit data
A particularly interesting method of studying the shadow economy is the use of operational audit data
collected by tax administrations. Erard (2002) describes a methodology where audited tax returns
are combined with unaudited tax returns in order to try to get rid of the selection bias. The bias
comes from the fact that tax audits in general are not performed at random, but rather they are being
targeted towards companies where the auditors believe tax noncompliance to be high.
This could be due to previous irregularities discovered in audits or simply the fact that a given company
operates in an industry where the authorities believe tax noncompliance to be high. It means that
treating operational audit data as a random sample from the whole tax return population leads to
selection bias.
Erard (2002) presents a methodology where a data sample containing s amount of returns that have
been operationally audited and t > s amount of returns that have not been audited at all. First a
likelihood for a given return to be audited is estimated. The likelihood is estimated by:
A∗ = β′AXA + A, (5)
where A* is an index of the likelihood of an audit with Xa characteristics will be audited, a is a
normally distributed error term, and Ba is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. If the likelihood
A* is > 0, it implies that a return has been audited.
In addition they allow correlation between the error term a in (5) and error terms in equations
estimating noncompliance. These correlations should be positive if there are problems with regard
to unobserved characteristics of the audits. In other words returns that were selected for operational
audits are likely to contain more noncompliance than unaudited returns as stated earlier. Thus by
estimating these correlations, they can test hypotheses of selection bias and correct such bias by
including the correlation terms in the noncompliance estimations.
Erard (2002) presents results of a study performed in the Chicago district using the methodology
described above. The two different forms of noncompliance examined were under-reporting of business
revenue and over-reporting of business expenses from self-employment. They disregarded the possi-
bility of overpayments, because overpayments were uncommon in the data sample. Noncompliance is
estimated as:
ln(R∗ +DR) = XRβR + R (6)
ln(E∗ +DE) = XEβE + E , (7)
where R is under-reporting of revenue, E is the over-reporting of expenses, Xr represents all recorded
characteristics that could potentially increase under-reporting of revenue, Xe represents all recorded
characteristics that could potentially increase over-reporting of expenses, and a is the random error
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term of factors not recorded in Xe. Dr and De are estimated displacement parameters that influence
the amount of mass under the displaced log-normal distribution where R=0 and E=0.
Noncompliance for two different business classes is estimated using the model specifications. The first
is businesses with under 25,000$ in revenue and the second is businesses with 25,000$ < total gross
receipts < 100,000$. The first sample consists of 221 audited returns and 911 unaudited returns while
the second sample consists of 342 audited returns and 1336 unaudited returns.
The authors compare actual and predicted magnitudes of noncompliance in the returns and discover
that the differences are very small. In this case the predictions seem accurate. Though predicting
understated revenue is slightly less accurate than predicting overstated expenses. In the first class the
model overpredicted revenue understatement by circa 7.7 % and in the second class the overprediction
was circa 4.5 %. The results are summarized in the tables below:
Table 1: Revenue under $25,000 (Erard 2002)
Understated revenue Overstated expenses
Actual % of returns with: 17.2 54.3
Predicted % of returns with: 17.2 55.5
Actual mean amount of: $1,365 $4,502
Predicted mean amount of: $1,470 $4,492
Table 2: Revenue between $25,000 and $100,000 (Erard 2002)
Understated revenue Overstated expenses
Actual % of returns with: 21.1 62.3
Predicted % of returns with: 21.3 62.4
Actual mean amount of: $3,920 $9,800
Predicted mean amount of: $3,750 $9,s801
Kosonen (2014) writes that performing enough random audits for the purposes of shadow economy
estimations is far too costly. The advantage of this method is that these audits are being performed as
we speak and the data flow is continuous. Thus this data ought to be used for research (Erard 2002).
In my view this method is particularly well suited for estimating the amount of unreported business
revenue and overstated expenses in Finland. By incorporating the data sample with a larger number
of unaudited periodic tax returns on top of results from operational tax audits, whole population
estimations could be extrapolated for different industries in Finland. The methodology could be used
to double check whether or not current shadow economy estimations in the Finnish national accounts
need revision. This is true if the estimations suggest that there is in fact unreported revenue in
industries where we have previously shadow economy to be zero or close to zero.
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2.3 Tax avoidance and compliance
One problem with measuring hidden economic activity is naturally the fact that not all taxes are left
unpaid on purpose. Some of these are honest mistakes and thus should not be classified under the
shadow economy.
Erard (1997) writes about the importance of tax compliance and critiques empirical research on the
topic. He argues that in a situation where tax noncompliance is high among large tax contributors,
the effective tax system is less progressive than thought. This results in an increase in inequality. This
is true for both individuals as well as companies and in my view can result in an unfair advantage for
large multinational companies that are able to afford expensive tax services such as transfer pricing in
order to minimize their tax burden.
Kosonen and Ropponen (2013) designed a field experiment to study VAT compliance when there
are changes in the tax system. They provided a randomly assigned treatment group information
about the tax code with a questionnaire, while a randomly assigned control group was only given the
questionnaire. This was related to the fact that the VAT rate was changed slightly a month before the
experiment.
They discover that there is a 5 % point difference in mistakes made by the groups in favour of the
treatment group. The result was statistically significant only with regards to the new and simple
change of the VAT rate. This study does however illustrate that mistakes are being made in e.g. VAT
reporting in Finland and that simply increasing the amount of information available to companies
might lead to better compliance over all.
Thus the effective level of taxation depends not only on the law, but also on how well agents choose to
comply with the regulations. The latter is influenced by the perceived probability of getting caught,
but also factors such as reputation and social stigma, which can lead to higher compliance rates than
a simple game theoretical model of risks and pay-offs would suggest (Andreoni et al. 1998).
Erard defines the GDP gap as the difference between market-based income, both legal and illegal,
and the portion of market transactions in recorded GDP. However he writes that this gap should not
be thought to be equal to unreported taxable income. Some income may be exempt from taxation
and the concept of taxable income is larger than the definition of GDP e.g. capital gains are taxable
income, but not recorded in GDP calculations.
Additionally some transactions that are unreported in tax returns can in fact be recorded elsewhere
in the national accounts through e.g. shadow economy estimations. Thus the GDP gap is most
likely smaller than the sum of unreported taxable income. Another problem lies in the fact that tax
noncompliance also takes other forms. Companies can overstate their business expenses and apply for
more deductions than they are entitled to.
However small corporations are likely to exhibit similar forms of noncompliance as individuals meaning
that a large percentage of noncompliance will likely be in the form of undeclared revenue and overstated
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expenses or wages paid in cash. Large corporations on the other hand use more creative and expensive
approaches such as transfer pricing in order to minimize their tax burden. Thus large companies that
are e.g. listed in the stock exchange very likely contribute quite little to hidden economic production.
Slemrod (2007) writes about evasion of the income tax in the US. He argues that tax evasion has and
will most likely always exist and that it is not clear how much tax noncompliance can be reduced by
directing more funds to enforcement. This remark applies also to tax audits, which are very costly to
perform.
Another important paper on tax evasion is Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), which presents theoretical
models that have incorporated tax evasion as a gamble where losing naturally means getting caught by
the tax administration. They called for more empirical research into the topic of tax evasion through
e.g. field experiments and propose sometimes tax avoidance is caused by the difficulties in formulating
well-defined laws.
Kleven et al. (2011) describe a tax enforcement experiment in Denmark. They draw attention to how
taxes are being reported in developed countries and how it affects tax noncompliance. They discover
that in a representative sample of over 40 000 income tax filers the tax evasion rate is close to zero
when their taxes are being reported by a third party such as their employer. They also discover that
the tax evasion rate is substantial if the incomes are self-reported and that having previously been
audited or threatened to be affect tax evasion on self-reported incomes.
They argue that previous studies on tax audits have not discovered a statistically significant relation-
ship between the threat of being audited and tax evasion because participants may have been aware of
the randomization involved. They mention the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)
that was conducted in the USA. If taxpayers were aware of the fact that the process of getting selected
was random, they may have not perceived the threat of being audited to be very high.
Vero will be increasing the size of random audits in Finland to 500 small- and medium-sized enterprises
in the near future. This could provide opportunities for studying the shadow economy with random
audit data. However since we would need a substantial amount of random audits for each industry
separately, it is most likely still the case that the amount of observations is far too small to perform
any type of whole population estimates of the shadow economy.
2.4 The Value-Added Tax Gap of Finland
IMF in cooperation with the Finnish Tax Administration Vero published a report in November 2015
that estimates the annual VAT gap for Finland from 2008 until 2014. The report first estimates
the potential VAT that could be collected and then compares this to the actual VAT collected. The
difference between these two is the VAT gap, which is divided into two parts; the compliance gap and
the policy gap (IMF 2015). This publication is a part of the Revenue Administration Gap Analysis
Program (RA-GAP).
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The policy gap refers to lost tax revenue from subsidies such as lower VAT rates and is not of interest
for this study. The compliance gap however is defined as ”The difference between the potential VAT
that could have been collected given the current policy framework and accrued VAT collections” (IMF
2015). The estimated compliance gap as a percent of GDP for Finland from 2008 until 2014 has been
modest and was 0.8 % of GDP in 2008 and 0.5 % of GDP in 2014 (IMF 2015). Improvements have
been made particularly in industries F, A-B, and K-L i.e. construction, agriculture, and real estate.
The compliance gap is further divided into two components. The assessment gap is defined as ”the
difference between potential collections given the current policy framework and the VAT declared” and
the collections gap is defined as ”the difference between VAT declared and the actual VAT revenue
collected” (IMF 2015). Thus the assessment gap divided by the highest VAT rate of a given year can
be interpreted as unassessed taxable revenue, which is a part of the shadow economy. The VAT gap
of Finland is visualized in Figure 2. and tabulated in Table 3.
Figure 2: The VAT gap of Finland (IMF 2015)
To estimate the compliance gap IMF first employs the potential revenues model for estimating the
taxable value-added sector by sector. The potential revenues model can be written as:
PV s =
∑
c
(Msc τc)r
s + [
∑
c
(Y sc −Xsc )τc]rs − [
∑
c
(Nsc + I
s
c )τc]r
s(1− es)ηc (8)
where PV s is the potential VAT for a sector, MCs are imports, Y Cs is output, XCs is exports, NCs
is consumption, ICs is investment, τc is the applicable VAT rate, η
s
c is the proportion of input tax
credits allowed to be claimed, rs is the proportion of output produced by registered businesses in a
sector, es is the proportion of exempt output in a sector, with s denoting sector and c commodity.
The first five variables i.e. Y, X, M, N, and I have been extracted from statistical supply-use tables
that are maintained by Statistics Finland. τc is what the authors call a policy variable and the rate is
whatever the applicable rate is for a given commodity c. ηsc is another policy variable which was set
to zero for commodities such as restaurant meals have a general disallowance for input tax credits and
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set to one for other commodities. Finally rs was estimated in cooperation with authorities such as
customs. Rs was assumed to be equal for Y, X, I, and N since coming up with separate values would
”greatly increase the time and effort” with ”no discernible difference in final results” (IMF 2015).
Determining actual VAT collected is more difficult than it might sound like. Actual collections were
measured using the same variables as in the potential revenues model. The important thing is reallo-
cating collections into the period the tax actually accrued. These accrued collections can be written
as:
AV s = Cs + P s −Rs(+OP s) (9)
where AV s is accrued VAT collections, Cs is collections at customs, P s is payments received, Rs is
excess credit accrued, and OP s is payments offset by excess credit. Data for Cs is obtained from
the customs declaration database, data for P s is obtained from the payments transaction database
presumably maintained by Vero, Rs is calculated from the tax returns database similarly to to OP s.
For a more detailed description of the methods used please refer to IMF 2015.
If we assume that the potential VAT has been measured accurately, which is a strong assumption,
we can further assume that the assessment gap part of the compliance gap refers to VAT that should
have been declared from taxable revenue. Perhaps this revenue was purposefully hidden from the
authorities in order to avoid paying the VAT. This means that by using the compliance gap estimates
it is possible to calculate the amount revenue that is missing from the national accounts indicated by
the RA-GAP estimate
In my view the potential and accrued VAT calculations and the compliance gap should be used for
economic research. The argument is that since they already exist it would be wise to take advantage
of them.
My calculations are not exhaustive. Rather they just show what the RA-GAP estimate roughly
indicates on the size of the shadow economy. IMF (2015) suggests that the compliance gap can be
compared with effect of policy measures, by using the indicators based on hypothetical tax legislation
and the analyses of the effects due to changes in tax policies.
The compliance gap is measured as a percentage of GDP. Thus the compliance of a given year should
be multiplied with the GDP of that year in order to calculate the compliance gap in billions of euros.
Table 3. shows the compliance gap as a percentage of GDP for all industries starting from 2008.
We can see that e.g. in F Construction the gap has shrunk from 0.4 % of GDP in 2008 to 0.2 % in
2011 of GDP implying that the compliance gap has halved. It should be noted that these percentages
include both the collections and the compliance gap. Thus the estimates of hidden revenue indicated
by the RA-GAP are by definition upward biased since they include the collections gap as well.
Table 4. is the annual GDP of Finland with current prices taken from the Statistics Finland website.
It is evident that interesting industries are those where both the compliance gap and the gross output
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Table 3: The compliance gap by industry as a percentage of GDP
A-B C D-E F G-H I J K-L M-N O-Q R-S
2008 0.2 0 0.2 0.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0
2009 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0
2010 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 -0.2 0.1 0 0 0
2011 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0
2012 0.1 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0
2013 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0
2014 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0 0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0
Table 4: The GDP of Finland with current prices
Year GDP
2008 193.711
2009 181.029
2010 187.100
2011 196.869
2012 199.793
2013 202.742
2014 205.178
are high. These industries such as C Manufacturing and F Construction are also the ones where major
improvements have been made in recent years according to the RA-GAP.
I first divide the compliance gaps in Table 3. by 100 in order to get the decimal value. That decimal
value is then multiplied with the GDP of that year in order to calculate the compliance gap. The
numbers compliance gaps were divided with the highest VAT rate of a given year and the year 2010
was divided in half since the VAT rate increased starting from July 2011. This yields the unassessed
revenue estimated straight from the compliance gap. The results are presented in tables 18. and 19.
in the appendix.
It is evident that industries A-B, C, D-E, and F Construction appear to contribute to the compliance
gap along with K-L. C in 2013 is the only industry where the compliance gap has gone up in these four
industries since 2008 while in all other industries the gap has shrunk after the financial crisis. This
may be explained by the fact that tax debts tend to increase during a recession (Ristola and Tiira
2012).
Table 5. shows the sum of unassessed revenue in billions of euros and as a percentage of GDP. Keep
in mind that these estimates are by definition upward biased since the compliance gap includes the
collections gap as well. According to these estimates the percentage of hidden revenue has declined
sharply from 2008 to just below 1.7 % of GDP in 2014. In order to comply with the definition of the
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Table 5: Unassessed revenue as a percentage of GDP
Year Sum (bn euro) Percentage
2008 8.81 4.55
2009 8.22 4.55
2010 4.16 2.22
2011 3.42 1.74
2012 2.60 1.30
2013 5.10 2.50
2014 3.42 1.67
shadow economy an estimate of illegal production should be added on top of these estimates. Statistics
Finland has estimated the gross value added of illegal production in Finland at around 180 million
euro in recent years. Thus the entire shadow economy would be less than 2 % of GDP in 2014.
Another option is to concentrate on the assessment gap on the national economy level. IMF (2015)
does not tell us how the compliance gap is divided into the assessment and collections gaps for each
industry. In addition Savolainen (2016) argues that the distribution of the compliance gap by industry
are simply approximations. Thus the compliance gap on the national economy level is a more reliable
estimate.
Table 6: The compliance gap as a percentage of GDP
Year Collections gap Assessment gap
2008 0.3 0.5
2009 0.2 0.5
2010 0.1 0.3
2011 0.1 0.5
2012 0.1 0.3
2013 0.2 0.3
2014 0.2 0.3
Unassessed revenue is calculated in euros by first dividing the gap by 100 and then multiplying with
the GDP of that year. The result is then divided with the highest VAT rate just as earlier to derive the
hidden revenue indicated by the assessment gap in table 7. This calculation indicates that the amount
of unassessed revenue in Finland has been around 2.5 billion euro or about 1.3 % of GDP since 2012.
No intermediate products have been subtracted from the numbers. Both ways of calculating hidden
revenue from the RA-GAP estimates provide further evidence that the shadow economy of Finland is
quite small. This is in contrast to both Hirvonen et al. (2010) and Schneider (2013).
There are a number of problems with the IMF RA-GAP estimates related to i.a. the negative values
in some industries. We also do not know how the compliance gap is divided into the assessment and
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Table 7: The assessment gap as a percentage of GDP
Year Unassessed revenue (bn euro) Percentage of GDP
2008 4.40 2.73
2009 4.11 2.73
2010 2.50 1.33
2011 4.28 2.20
2012 2.61 1.30
2013 2.53 1.25
2014 2.56 1.25
collections gap in each of the industries. Presumably the assessment gap should not be negative and
the negative values are explained by margins of error or the collections gap.
The compliance gap has been on a downward trend since 2008 and is likely very small. If the amount
of VAT that the government fails to collect given the current policy framework is small, it follows that
the shadow economy of Finland should be small as well. Thus according to the RA-GAP estimate no
large gains can be obtained from the shadow economy by increasing resources in surveillance.
However according to IMF (2015) the VAT gap of Finland is so small partly due to effective enforcement
by Vero. This means that the small VAT gap does not indicate that resources should be cut. Perhaps
that the amount of surveillance combined with the positive attitudes regarding taxes in Finland is
good as it is.
3 Background
This section presents background on the shadow economy of Finland. I review some of the recent
estimates of the size of the shadow economy in Finland. As mentioned before the range of estimates
is very large.
A revised statistical standard industrial classification, TOL 2008, was introduced in Finland starting
from the first release of data on each statistical topic in 2009. The detailed level classification is
tabulated in Table 20 in the appendix.
In this section I present information on the size of the shadow economy currently being added into
the Finnish national accounts in the private sector S11. I use the detailed level classification described
in Table 20. In Table 21. in the appendix are hidden production numbers as a percentage of output
added into the national accounts in 2014. The percentage of shadow economy is added on top of the
GDP by industry.
It should be noted that intermediate products have not been subtracted from the estimates. In some
industries, like 412 + 432 439 i.e. housebuilding, no hidden production is currently being added in the
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national accounts. This does not mean that the value of shadow economy is estimated to be zero.
Statistics Finland estimates that hidden production of housebuilding is included in the output since
output is calculated as a product of quantity and price. For all other industries that are not included
in Table 21. the value of hidden production is zero in the national accounts.
From Table 21. in the appendix we can see that industries such as F construction, G wholesale- and
retail trade, H transportation and storage, and L real estate activities are major contributors to the
shadow economy of Finland according to the national accounts. These industries are also considered to
have a relatively large compliance gap as indicated by Table 3. However there are disparities between
the compliance gap estimate and the Finnish national accounts as well.
The industries D and E have been estimated to have had a compliance gap of 0.1 in 2014, but no
hidden production was added to the national accounts in 2014. One possible explanation is that VAT
has been allocated differently at Vero and Statistics Finland (Savolainen 2016). For example even if a
company operates in multiple industries, Vero may allocate all of the VAT into one industry.
In addition some hidden production was added to both industries R Arts, entertainment, and recre-
ation, and S other services in 2014. IMF (2015) has estimated the compliance gap of R-S to be zero.
Most of these disparities are probably due to the fact that revenue has been allocated differently and
also due to the margin of error of the estimations.
Current estimates for the size of the shadow economy of Finland vary substantially. In 2008 Statistics
Finland estimated this number to be rather small at circa 1.5% of GDP (Nurminen 2008). Hirvonen et
al. (2010) in a report conducted for the Parliament of Finland estimated estimated the fiscal shadow
economy to be 6.9% of GDP.
Hirvonen et al. (2010) potentially treat the results of operational tax audits as random audits (Viren
2013 and include capital gains tax evasion in their definition but exclude the illegal economy. This
causes a selection bias since tax audits are obviously not performed at random.
Due to problems with the methods employed and their atypical definition, this report is not comparable
with other shadow economy estimates that are based on appropriate methods and use a definition
approved by e.g. the OECD.
Hirvonen responded to Viren in 2013 in the Finnish Economic Journal where he stresses the fact that
their study was concerned with how much revenue was hidden from the tax authorities and not missing
production from the national accounts. This argument further emphasizes the point that the Hirvonen
et al. (2010) report is in fact studying an altogether different phenomenon.
Attempting to estimate the loss of tax revenue might be even more difficult than estimating production
missing from the national accounts. Hirvonen et al. (2010) discover that the difference between
potential and actual tax revenue was around 2 billion euro in Finland, which would imply that the size
of the shadow economy could very well be substantially higher than e.g. Nurminen (2008) estimated.
Viren (2015) argues that since the tax audits have produced so little revenue for the government, the
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size of the shadow economy must be quite small or at least a lot smaller than e.g. Schneider and Enste
(2000) implies. Otherwise we would have seen better results from tax audits.
Additionally Viren (2015) also argues that in many of the fields typically associated with a high degree
of informality such as construction and restaurants, the operating margins are so small that even a
small increase in costs through taxes would lead many of these firms to bankruptcy. Thus potential tax
revenue is small and salaries earned in the shadow economy are also being used to fund transactions
in the formal economy and thus produce tax revenue through indirect taxes.
However both of these numbers are much smaller than estimates produced with indirect methods like
some academic papers published even in top journals such as the Journal of Economic Literature.
Most recently Schneider (2013) estimated the shadow economy of Finland at 13.3% of GDP in 2012,
which translates into (0.133 · 199.8) ≈ 26.44 billion euro.
This estimate is difficult to compare with others. This publication was funded by the credit card
company VISA and it advocates the usage of credit cards as a payment system in order to decrease
the size of shadow economy.
The larger problem with these estimates, the ones based on indirect methods in particular, is that
they are estimating something which is not based on any formal economic theory. In fact the models
simply assume where people spend their cash. According to Thomas (1999) we should be very careful
about accepting these estimates as they might be influenced by political beliefs as discussed in the
introduction.
OECD (2002) writes that the reason behind economists using these methods is that the procedures of
compiling the national accounts are not transparent enough. Perhaps not all relevant data is available.
This may force researchers to employ these indirect methods.
4 Data
The data on revenue in the construction industry has been obtained from periodic tax returns that are
stored at the Statistics Finland database. The industry has been divided into three parts i.a. due to
differences in absolute size. These industries are 411 development of building projects, 412 + 432 439
housebuilding, and 42 + 431 civil engineering. Together these three roughly form the industry F
construction, which accounts for over 6 % or 12 billion euro of Gross Value Added in the Finnish
economy (Finnish National Accounts).
My data set is a collection of monthly observations by industry starting from 01/1999 and ending in
09/2015. The variable I am interested in is called lv Kotimaa (previously vermyper) which is a sum
of all taxable revenue in Finland. It includes sales at different VAT rates as well as sales that are
subjected to the reverse VAT (lv RakenPalvMyynti). I have restricted my analysis to the sector S11
i.e. the private sector for simplicity. The red line in the graphs refers to 04/2011 which is when the
reverse VAT was officially introduced.
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In these periodic tax returns companies declare a number of things related to their business monthly,
quarterly, or annually. Companies have to declare how much revenue they have subjected the three
VAT rates. In addition they declare information on tax deductions they are entitled to and wage
information. A taxpayer has to declare periodic tax returns if they are liable to pay VAT and/or if
they have employees. The actual document that taxpayers fill and return to Vero can be found in the
appendix.
Figure 3: X12 seasonally adjusted revenue in 42+431
Figure 3. shows a seasonally adjusted graph of revenue in 42 + 431 beginning in January 1999 and
ending in September 2015. The data was aggregated from the actual periodic tax returns. Prior to
2008 the industry experienced steady growth in terms of reported revenue. The drop after 2008 is quite
evident but the industry appears to have recovered at least in terms of reported revenue. In terms of
gross output 42 + 431 is a circa 6.5 billion euro industry annually. The reverse VAT was implemented
for projects starting after April 2011 so roughly halfway between 2010 and 2012.
In addition to reported revenue I am also interested in how much deductions companies declare.
Claiming too many deductions is a way for taxpayers to avoid paying taxes. Figure 4. is a seasonally
adjusted graph of deductions in 42+431. Unsurprisingly the trend has been very similar in deductions
and reported revenue. Deductions in 42 + 431 increased steadily until they came crashing down after
2008 and have since recovered.
The same data was naturally for the two other industries that fall under F construction as well.
412 + 432 439 is large in terms of gross output at over 16 billion euro in 2014. 411 on the other hand
is a very small industry at just over 200 million euro in gross output in 2014.
Figure 5. is a graph that shows revenue in 412+432 439 starting from 01/1999 and ending in 09/2015.
Again the reverse VAT was implemented for projects starting after April 2011. Similarly to 42 + 431
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Figure 4: X12 seasonally adjusted deductions in 42+431
Figure 5: X12 seasonally adjusted revenue in 412 + 432 439
there is a clear seasonal trend and there was a dip in revenue from 2008 to 2009.
However the industry seems to have managed to recover from the crisis in terms of reported revenue.
In fact we can see a very high peak in the data on reported revenue after 2014. Housebuilding is
currently very active particularly in urban centres. Large scale projects are currently going on in e.g.
old docklands in Helsinki. Presumably the trend will continue in the near future.
Figure 6. shows the graph for deductions. Again some high peaks are present in the data. This may
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Figure 6: X12 seasonally adjusted deductions in 412 + 432 439
be due to the nature of the construction industry. Typically in the industry revenue is declared on
an accrual basis. This means that revenue for a large project is declared after completion and not
continuously throughout the project.
Figure 7: Revenue in 411
Figure 7. presents revenue in 411. Clearly the industry is much smaller than the other two in terms
of reported revenue. Just before 2008 there was a large peak in the data. The small absolute size of
the industry may be behind this. Just a few large development projects may cause such outliers.
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Figure 8: Deductions in 411
Deductions in 411 have followed roughly the same trend as shown by Figure 8. However the outliers
are not as obvious as in the case of revenue.
5 Method
It is possible that prior to the reverse VAT reform some subcontractors have failed to declare and
pay VAT. In addition Vero (2012) wrote that it is possible that after the reform subcontractors have
started to report more revenues. This hypothesis provides motivation for my research.
The effect could be studied by comparing reported revenue in periodic tax returns before and after April
2011. But this does not take into account the business cycle or seasonal trends. Thus the specified
model needs to eliminate the seasonal trend in the data. An autoregressive model with exogenous
variables (ARX) and a dummy variable will be employed. The seasonal trend will be eliminated by
taking the logarithm and adding 12 seasonal dummies as regressors.
Additionally it is possible to forecast reported revenue or deductions using the specified model. These
forecasted values can be compared with actual observations of revenue and deductions, which allows
us to see if there are any systematic differences between the two. The possible differences can then be
compared with the estimate produced by Ristola and Tiira (2012).
In my research this forecast that is compared with actual observations is based on a pure autoregressive
AR(p) model. The model can be written as:
Yt = θ1yt−1 + θ2yt−2 + ...+ θpyt−p + t (10)
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And the h-step forecast is obtained as:
Yt+h|T = θ1yT+h−1|T + θ2yT+h−2|T + ...+ θpyT+h−p|T (11)
A highly statistically significant dummy variable could provide evidence that after the reverse VAT
reform companies in the construction industry have started to report previously unreported revenue.
The same logic applies for tax deductions as well. Thus by introducing the reverse VAT in other
industries, tax revenue could be increased at relatively little cost based on the surveys conducted by
Vero.
The significance of the dummy is studied by comparing the t and p values with critical values at
different confidence levels. The hypotheses I am testing are:
Hypothesis 1 Reported revenues have increased after the implementation of the reverse VAT in 2011.
Hypothesis 2 Reported deductions have increased after the implementation of the reverse VAT in
2011.
In an ARX(p) model, the first p lags of each variable in the model will be used as regression predictors
and the order p is selected using sequential testing. A general form ARX(p) model, with a dummy
variable included, can be written as:
Yt = θ1Yt−1 + θ2Yt−2 + ...+ θpYt−p + ηpGt−p + ρpDt−p + t (12)
where Yt−p are past values of Yt i.e. reported revenue, Dt is the dummy variable for the reverse VAT
that begins in March 2011, Gt is the sum of wages paid as the exogenous explanatory variable, and
t is the error term. For the estimation with no dummy, the variable Dt is simply set to equal zero.
My model also includes seasonal twelve seasonal dummies as exogenous explanatory variables to help
account for seasonal trends in construction. This is a necessary improvement of the model for the
dependent variable to become stationary.
The construction industry has been estimated to be one of the largest industries of tax noncompliance
in Finland (IMF 2015), though it has been on the decline since 2008. In fact IMF have estimated that
the compliance gap in construction has decreased from 0.4% of GDP in 2008 and 0.3% of GDP in 2011
to 0.2% of GDP in 2011 and has remained constant since. Thus the compliance gap in construction
was higher before the reverse VAT was implemented.
This may be explained simply by the business cycle. But both the size of the compliance gap and the
recent downward trend make the industry an interesting topic of study. The reverse VAT implemen-
tation in April 2011 also allows us to study the indirect effects of a tax policy change on the shadow
economy. According to Kleven et al. (2011) third party reporting may decrease tax evasion.
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If the dummy variable indicating the reform is a statistically significant explanatory variable of the
amount of revenue, it could provide evidence that the reform has had some effect. However I do not
claim causality. The possible results should obviously be interpreted with caution.
The dummy variable was given the value one starting from a given month, which was chosen to be
March 2011, and zero for all previous observations. The problem with studying the effect of the policy
change is that it only concerns construction projects that began after April 1st 2011. This includes
construction projects where the contract was made in e.g. March 2011 even if construction began after
April 1st.
Since the law was passed in June 2010 this gave companies that were trying to hide revenue the
opportunity to make contracts so that the projects did not fall under the reverse VAT legislation. This
effect called the anticipation effect makes estimating the effects difficult. Another problem is the fact
that the financial crisis led to a strong business cycle after 2008. I estimate the significance of a dummy
variable starting in March 2011. This variable describes the implementation of the reverse VAT.
6 Results
I focus on the effect of a policy change on the shadow economy. Kosonen (2014) argues that since we
cannot know the exact size of the shadow economy, focus should be on its causes and consequences.
Construction is a field typically associated with a high shadow economy (Viren 2013). IMF (2015) has
estimated that the compliance gap in the construction industry is high, but has been declining since
2008. This has likely been caused by the improved business cycle. But the reverse VAT may have
played a role as well.
The results are presented separately for each of the three industries. First I present the results of the
significance tests with logarithm of revenue as the dependent variable. However due to the fact this
estimation is measuring something that cannot be directly observed poses a lot of challenges.
I also study if the same dummy is a statistically significant explanatory variable for the logarithm of
tax deductions. If deductions have increased along with the amount of VAT declared, the increase in
the tax base could be lower than the increase in reported revenue would imply.
I also estimate the effect of the dummy by comparing two different estimates. One estimate was
calculated with the dummy included and one without. Systematic difference between the two could
be interpreted as an effect of the dummy variable. However it seems that this method may not be
suitable for estimating the effect of the dummy as the other parameter estimates change to account
for the omitted dummy.
In addition I study if there are any systematic differences between actual observations of revenue and
the forecasted values. This forecast is based on a pure autoregressive model AR(p) with seasonal
dummies.
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6.1 The effect of the reverse VAT reform
The Tax Administration of Finland introduced a reverse value-added tax (VAT) in construction services
starting in April 2011. What it means is simply that for all new projects starting after April 1st 2011,
the responsibility to declare and pay the VAT has been with the buyer instead of the multitude of
sellers and subcontractors. This is applied for the sale of construction services and the hiring of labour
where the buyer is a regular in the field of construction services or real estate.
The goal was to prevent financial crime and unrecorded economic activity in the industry. The com-
petitive position of companies that have previously complied with all regulations was also thought
to improve. The Tax Administration have themselves estimated that this has brought in at least 75
million euro in additional revenue annually. The problem with this estimate is that it has not been
adjusted for the business cycle or seasonal trends. Also we know that tax debts typically tend to
increase in a recession (Ristola and Tiira 2012).
In April 2012 Vero conducted a survey of 397 companies and 345 accounting companies where they
inquired about possible challenges related to the reverse VAT system. Confederation of Finnish Con-
struction Industries (RT) performed a similar though slightly smaller survey of their members around
the same time. A majority of the companies had business revenue under 300k with the majority of
respondents stating that the reverse VAT would increase red tape and thought it was confusing.
Over half of the respondents thought that the reform was useless, 21 % thought it might increase tax
revenue, and finally the majority of respondents were doubtful that it would have an effect on the
shadow economy (Ristola and Tiira 2012). However through later surveys and internal analysis Vero
has concluded that after early challenges the system now works well.
RT, who originally opposed the reform, has now concluded that it has worked better than expected
and has possibly decreased the shadow economy. Among others The Finnish Scrapdealers Associaton
has indicated their interest in the reverse VAT system in order to decrease crime, shadow economy,
and increase fair competition in the industry (Ristola and Tiira 2012).
In the Ristola and Tiira (2012) report two possible scenarios where additional revenue could come
from were identified. First of all a subcontractor can previously have declared the tax, but has failed
to pay it. If this scenario is estimated to have brought in additional tax revenue, it implies that the
reverse VAT system has simply led to a decrease in the tax debt owned by companies in the industry.
Secondly the subcontractor could have both left the tax undeclared and unpaid. However in the
estimate calculated by Vero all additional tax revenue has come from the first scenario and the second
scenario has been assumed to equal zero.
Assume that the total amount of reported revenue and/or deductions have increased after implementing
the reverse VAT. Then the second scenario were previously a subcontractor has failed to report revenue
may not have been zero and it has decreased after the reform.
Kleven et al. (2011) discover that in the case of individual income tax filers the rate of tax evasion is
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close to zero if reported by a third party. This results may be applicable to the reverse VAT as well.
After April 1st 2011 the responsibility to declare the VAT on the sale of construction services has no
longer been with the seller but rather with the buyer.
If the result of Kleven et al. (2011) holds for corporate tax filers as well, the reverse VAT should have
decreased tax noncompliance in the industry, because the companies may not be able to cheat in the
same way as before.
In their risk analysis Vero stated that the purchases of construction services were smaller than expected
after the implementation. This result is discovered when comparing the the purchases and sales of
construction services. This perhaps implies that not all of the purchases of construction services
subjected to the reverse VAT have been declared in the periodic tax returns (Ristola and Tiira 2012).
This could mean that the estimated increase in tax revenue is downward biased and provides further
motivation for empirical research.
This could be explained with mistakes such as declaring purchases of construction services as regular
purchases in periodic tax returns. Additionally companies could have declared revenue not subjected
to the reverse VAT as such. Or maybe some of the purchases of construction services, from which the
VAT is calculated from, were not reported purposefully in order to avoid paying the tax.
One difficulty in measuring the changes in tax revenue is that only 73 % of construction services were
filed under the construction industry in the national accounts. Thus 27 % of services that are subjected
to the reverse VAT were not included in the estimations (Ristola and Tiira 2012). This could mean
that the current estimate is downward biased due to lack of data.
In order to test for robustness of the results, the same regression can be estimated for industries where
no VAT reform has been made. This is necessary only if the dummy is discovered to be statistically
significant. Examples of such industries are wholesale trade and restaurants, which are quite similar
in absolute size to 42 + 431.
6.1.1 Estimating the effect in Civil Engineering
The regression I estimate in the industry 42 + 431 has an autoregressive AR(p) part in addition to
the dummy variables, and the sum of wages paid in the industry. Sequential testing is applied for
selecting p. Apart from dummies the variables are made logarithmic. The results of the estimation
and stationarity tests along with error diagnostics can be found in the appendix under regression 1
and diagnostics 1.
The series exhibits a clear seasonal trend such that reported revenue tends to increase through the end
of the year. There was also quite a clear drop in revenue from in 2010 but the industry appears to
have managed a quick recovery such that the peak of 2011 was higher than the peak of 2009. Figure
9. is the model I have fitted for the data.
Based on the Dickey-Fuller Unit Root test statistics and the root of the modulus being less than one in
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Figure 9: The model for logarithm of revenue 42+431
Regression 1, I conclude that the time series I am estimating is stationary. The seasonal trend has been
eliminated with the help of the twelve seasonal dummy variables. Stationary holds for regressions with
more observations as well. From the error diagnostics in the appendix we see that the series exhibits
no autocorrelation and that the model fits the data quite well.
The dummy does not appear to be a statistically significant explanatory variable for revenue at the 95%
confidence with a time series from 01/1999 to 12/2011. The conclusion is based on the relatively high
p-value and relatively low t statistic. However it does appear to be significant at the 90% confidence
level based on the t value being > 1.645 and p-value being < 0.1. The results for different data lengths
can be found in Table 8. below. The results provide some weak evidence to support hypothesis 1.
Table 8: Significance of the dummy on revenue in 42+431
Data length Estimate t value Pr > |t|
2011M12 0.11967 1.70 0.0919
2012M12 0.11396 1.67 0.0972
2013M12 0.11091 1.66 0.0992
2014M12 0.11333 1.74 0.0835
Based on these estimates the hypothesis that reported revenues have increased after the reform cannot
be discarded and the sign of the estimate is positive. The estimate is in fact intuitively very high at
over 0.11. Something else than the tax reform may be behind the high estimate.
In addition to testing the significance of the dummy I also compare the forecasted values with actual
observations in 42 + 431. I want to see if the model systematically underpredicts revenue when
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comparing forecasted values with actual observations. The forecast is based on a pure AR(p) model
described in equations 10 and 11. If this were true and the differences were substantial, it would imply
that the actual observed values were systematically higher than the model suggests.
Figure 10: Forecasted values and actual observations of revenue in 42 + 431
Figure 10. shows the differences for years 2011, 2012, and 2013. Lcl and ucl denote lower and upper
confidence limits respectively. The largest difference appears to be in 2011 where the observation for
August is higher than the upper confidence limit. However in the long run the differences appear to
be smaller. But something happened in 2011 that caused the observation to be higher than the model
would have suggested.
Table 9: Difference of actual and forecasted revenue in 42 + 431
Year Sum of log differences Exponential
2011 0.143661 1.154492
2012 .-0.06356 0.938416
2013 0.079458 1.082701
The sum of annual differences from 2011 until 2013 are shown in Table 9. The model does produce a
forecast error and the sum of the differences in generally positive. However the forecast error is very
small. The industry currently has a gross output of over 6 billion euro. A difference of around 1 million
euro is very small. This does not provide any evidence to support hypothesis 1. Something else must
have caused the significance and the high estimate of the dummy variable in Table 8.
In order to measure the effect of the dummy variable I estimate two separate regressions using the
same data. One has the dummy variable as an explanatory variable and the other does not. The
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possible difference between these two estimates could be interpreted as the effect of the dummy. The
difference of estimates is plotted in Figure 11.
Figure 11: The difference of estimates of revenue in 42 + 431
The difference of the estimates is close to zero everywhere else apart from March where the dummy
variable first gets a value of one. No differences can be observed even in August even though Figure
10. may have suggested so. It seems that the other parameter estimates change in order to account
for the omitted dummy. Thus this method does not seem to be feasible for estimating the effect of the
dummy.
Vero (2012) also pointed out that even if the reverse VAT implementation has indeed led to an increase
in reported revenues, it might also be the case that simultaneously companies have started to report
more deductions. This would mean that the tax base in the industry has increased by less than the
increase in reported revenue would suggest.
There seems to be a clear seasonal trend in deductions just as there was in revenue. There was a large
drop in deductions after the financial crisis and recently deductions have been increasing.
I estimate a similar regression for the variable VahennVero (previously vahvero) as the dependent
variable, which includes tax deductions for a given month. All of the variables are made logarithmic
apart from the dummy. Sequential testing is used for order selection and the dummy equals one
starting from 03/2011. Figure 12. is the model I have fitted for the logarithm of deductions.
The model seems to fit the data well and based on the Dickey-Fuller tests in regression 2 and the
root of modulus being less than 1, I conclude that the series is stationary. The series exhibits no
autocorrelation based on Diagnostics 2. in the appendix. The results of the significance tests and the
estimate with data lengths can be found in Table 10.
31
Figure 12: The model for logarithm of deductions in 42+431
Table 10: Significance of the dummy on deductions in 42+431
Data length Estimate t value Pr > |t|
2011M12 0.05077 1.85 0.0668
2012M12 0.03524 1.71 0.0895
2013M12 0.03601 1.96 0.0516
2014M12 0.03111 1.82 0.0712
The results indicate that the dummy variable is a statistically significant explanatory variable of the
logarithm of deductions at the 90% confidence level. These results provide some weak evidence to
support hypothesis 2 in the industry 42 + 431.
Figure 13. shows the difference of estimates in the case of deductions. The same conclusion is reached
as with regards to revenue. The other parameter estimates change to account for the omitted dummy.
Additionally the estimates of the dummy seem suspiciously high. In 2014 the estimate of the dummy
in revenue is 11.3% and 3.1% in deductions. This would imply that as a result of the policy reform the
tax base, defined as the difference of the estimates, in 42 + 431 has increased by 8.4%. In an industry
with a gross output of over 6 billion euro annually that increase is simply too high to believe.
Most likely something else was happening in the industry around that time that caused a structural
break in the time series. In order to see if this is the case, I perform a Chow test for the presence of a
structural break in early 2011. The results of the Chow test at different break points are tabulated in
Table 11.
Table 11. shows that the Chow test is significant for all break points specified. This implies that in
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Figure 13: The difference of estimates of deductions in 42+431
Table 11: Chow Test with log lkv as the dependent variable
Break point Num DF Den DF F value Pr > F
2011M01 3 195 6.33 0.0004
2011M02 3 195 5.23 0.0017
2011M03 3 195 4.53 0.0043
2011M04 3 195 4.58 0.0040
2011M05 3 195 4.22 0.0064
2011M06 3 195 4.13 0.0073
2011 the time series experienced a structural change of some sort and that is causing unreliability of
the model. Thus the dubiously high estimates of the dummy variable can likely be explained with
the presence of a structural break in the times series and not the reverse VAT implementation. This
indicates that no evidence to support hypotheses 1 or 2 in 42 + 431 is discovered.
6.1.2 Estimating the effect in Housebuilding
Housebuilding is a major industry in Finland and e.g. in 2014 its gross output was circa 16.7 billion
euro. Similarly to 42 + 431 the regression I estimate has an autoregressive AR(p) part in addition to
the dummy variables, and the sum of wages paid in the industry during a given month. Sequential
testing is applied for selecting p. Apart from dummies the variables are made logarithmic. Figure 14.
is the model I have fitted for the data.
From the Dickey-Fuller tests printed out in regression 3 in the appendix and the root of the modulus
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Figure 14: The model for logarithm of revenue in 412 + 432 439
being less than one, I conclude that the series has a single mean and is stationary i.e. the twelve seasonal
dummies have eliminated the seasonal trend in the series. The series exhibits no autocorrelation.
The results of the regression with different data lengths are summarized below. In this industry the
dummy is not a statistically significant explanatory variable of reported revenue at any confidence
level. This conclusion is based on the low t values and high p values of the dummy variable. The
results are shown in Table 12.
Table 12: Significance of the dummy on revenue in 412 + 432 439
Data length Estimate t value Pr > |t|
2011M12 0.01657 0.70 0.4831
2012M12 0.00222 -0.13 0.9000
2013M12 0.01047 -0.66 0.5099
2014M12 0.01242 -0.84 0.4018
The large p values and small t values in all of the regressions indicate that no evidence to support
hypothesis 1 in the industry is discovered. With data length until 2012M12 there is a 90% probability
of observing a difference due to random sampling error.
Similarly to 42 + 431 I also study if there are any systematic differences between forecasted values
and actual observations of revenue. Figure 15. shows that the difference between the actual and the
forecasted values seems to fluctuate. No systematic underpredicting can be observed.
The sum of annual differences from 2011 until 2013 are shown in Table 13. The model produces a
forecast error. However the sum of the forecast error is very small. Keep in mind that the industry has
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Figure 15: Forecasted values and actual observations of revenue in 412 + 432 439
Table 13: Difference of actual and forecast in 412 + 432 439
Year Sum of log differences Exponential
2011 0.250276 1.28438
2012 -0.01505 0.985057
2013 -0.02274 0.977517
a gross output of over 16 billion euro. Thus a difference of approximately 1 million euro is extremely
small. No evidence to support hypothesis 1 is discovered in this industry either.
Figure 16. shows the possible effect of the dummy variable on revenue as the difference of estimates.
Clearly the estimates are nearly perfectly aligned. Again the other parameter values change to account
for the omitted dummy. The method may not be suitable for studying the effect of the dummy.
I estimate the same regression for the logarithm of deductions. Based on the Dickey-Fuller tests printed
out in regression 4 in the appendix and the roots of the modulus being less than one, I conclude that
the series is stationary with a single mean. The series does not exhibit autocorrelation and the model
seems to fit the data well. The model is plotted below in Figure 17.
The dummy is not a statistically significant explanatory variable of deductions at any confidence level
with any data length. The results are tabulated in Table 14. Thus no evidence to support hypothesis
2 in the industry is discovered.
Figure 18. shows the possible effect of the dummy variable on deductions as the difference of estimates.
Again the estimates are nearly perfectly aligned. The other parameter values change to account for
the omitted dummy. The method may not be suitable for studying the effect of the dummy.
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Figure 16: The difference of estimates of revenue in 412 + 432 439
Figure 17: The model for logarithm of deductions in 412 + 432 439
Based on the evidence tabulated and plotted above no evidence to support either hypothesis 1 or
hypothesis 2 is discovered in the industry 412 + 432 439.
6.1.3 Estimating the effect in Development of Building Projects
Development of Building Projects 411 is quite a small industry and in 2014 its gross output was circa
212 million euro. Again the regression I estimate has an autoregressive AR(p) part in addition to the
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Table 14: Significance of the dummy on deductions in 412 + 432 439
Data length Estimate t value Pr > |t|
2011M12 0.02573 0.93 0.3555
2012M12 0.01933 0.21 0.8343
2013M12 0.00403 0.23 0.8149
2014M12 0.00433 0.27 0.7878
Figure 18: The difference of estimates of deductions in 412 + 432 439
dummy variable, and the sum of wages paid in the industry as an exogenous explanatory variable.
Sequential testing is applied for selecting p. Apart from dummy the variables are made logarithmic.
From the Dickey-Fuller tests printed out in regression 5 in the appendix and the root of the modulus
being less than one, I conclude that the series has a single mean and is stationary. The twelve seasonal
dummies have eliminated the seasonal trend in the series and the series exhibits no autocorrelation.
Figure 19. is the model I have fitted for the data. There was a substantial dip revenue from 2009 to
2010 and the industry has not been able to recover in the same way as 42 + 431 and 412 + 432 439
have. This is not surprising given the small absolute size of the industry. Even a few projects can have
a large impact on the overall revenue.
The results of the significance test and estimates with different data lengths are tabulated in Table 15.
The dummy is not a statistically significant explanatory variable of revenue in the industry 411 with
any data length at any confidence level.
Again in addition to studying the parameter estimates the possible increase in reported revenue was
also studied by comparing forecasted values and actual observations. Figure 20. shows that the
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Figure 19: The model for logarithm of revenue in 411
Table 15: Significance of the dummy on revenue in 411
Data length Estimate t value Pr > |t|
2011M12 0.01721 0.31 0.7605
2012M12 0.00161 0.04 0.9684
2013M12 0.03122 0.90 0.3672
2014M12 0.02774 0.91 0.3616
difference between the actual and the forecasted values fluctuates. No systematic underpredicting can
be observed. Thus no evidence to support the hypothesis that revenues have increased after the reverse
VAT reform is discovered.
Table 16: Difference of actual and forecast in 411
Year Sum of log differences Exponential
2011 0.020371 1.02059
2012 0.055476 1.0570437
2013 0.438184 1.549889
The sum of annual differences from 2011 until 2013 are shown in Table 16. The difference of ap-
proximately 1 million euro is relatively smaller than in the other industries. It is interesting that the
difference seems to be relatively constant even if the absolute value of revenue changes. The difference
fluctuates and no evidence to support hypothesis 1 is discovered.
Figure 21. shows the difference of the estimates of revenue. The regression with a dummy variable
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Figure 20: Forecasted values and actual observations of revenue in 411
Figure 21: The difference of estimates of revenue in 411
estimates systematically higher values than one without the dummy. However that difference is very
small. As before the other parameter values change to account for the omitted dummy. The method
may not be suitable for studying the effect of the dummy.
I estimate the same regression for the logarithm of deductions. The results can be found in regression
6. The series is stationary with a single mean and exhibits no autocorrelation. The conclusion is
the same i.e. the dummy is not a statistically significant explanatory variable of deductions at any
confidence level. Figure 22. is the model I have fitted for deductions and the results of the significance
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Figure 22: The model for logarithm of deductions in 411
tests are tabulated in Table 17.
Table 17: Significance of the dummy on deductions in 411
Data length Estimate t value Pr > |t|
2011M12 0.4479 0.73 0.4684
2012M12 -0.0022 -0.01 0.9960
2013M12 0.4112 1.10 0.2720
2014M12 0.4163 1.24 0.2151
Figure 23. shows the possible effect of the dummy variable on deductions as the difference of estimates.
Again the estimate with the dummy is consistently slightly higher than one without. However the
other parameter values change to account for the omitted dummy. The method may not be suitable
for studying the effect of the dummy.
Based on the evidence presented above I conclude that no evidence to support hypothesis 1 or hypoth-
esis 2 is discovered in the industry 411.
40
Figure 23: The difference of estimates of deductions in 411
7 Discussion
In the previous section I presented results on regressions I performed in the construction industry. The
goal was to study if the implementation of the reverse VAT system has increased reported revenue
or deductions in the industry. The industry is further divided into three industries in the national
accounts.
In the industries 412+432 439 housebuilding and 411 development of building projects, no evidence to
support hypothesis 1 or hypothesis 2 is discovered. Construction is an industry where subcontracting
is highly typical. Thus the failure to reject the null is slightly surprising. It seems plausible that after
the reform subcontractors would have started to report more revenue.
In the industry 42+431 Civil Engineering the regressions produced interesting results. With regards to
reported revenue the dummy appears to be a statistically significant explanatory variable of reported
revenue at the 90% confidence level. Sequential testing was applied in order selection based on the
exogenous explanatory variable log palkat, which is a logarithm of the sum of wages paid in the
industry for a given month.
The same result was discovered with regards to deductions as well. In fact the p-values here are a
bit smaller than with reported revenue. A similar conclusion is reached. The dummy is a statistically
significant explanatory variable of deductions at the 90% confidence level.
However the Chow test of structural change suggests that in something happened in the industry in
early 2011. This structural change is causing the results to be unreliable. One option to get rid of
the problem is to estimate two separate regressions. One would be estimated with data ending in
2010M12 and one for the rest. However then the number of observations would be too small to draw
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any conclusions.
The reverse VAT can be a good reform even if it has not lead to an increase in reported revenue. It has
led to improved payments of VAT and it simplifies the tax system. The reform has attracted interest
in other industries as well. Additionally it is important to know how the shadow economy could be
decreased even if we do not know the exact size of the change. This can help make better decisions on
policy reforms regarding the shadow economy.
The effect was also studied by estimating the possible difference of two estimates in all three industries.
One that included the dummy variable and one that did not. Both reported revenue and deductions
were studied. No systematic difference between the estimates was discovered in any of the three
industries.
In fact this method may not be appropriate for estimating the effect of the dummy. When the dummy
is absent, other parameter estimates change, because they attempt to compensate for the omitted
dummy. Thus no conclusions can be made from the lack of difference between the estimates.
In addition actual observations were compared with forecasted values of reported revenue. The goal
was to see if the model systematically underpredicts revenue using a pure autoregressive model. No
systematic underprediction was discovered in any industry. In 42 + 431 one actual observation in 2011
was higher than the upper confidence limit of the model.
I performed similar analysis with the logarithm of deductions as the dependent variable, which are not
reported in the paper. However the conclusion was the same. No large systematic difference between
the estimate and actual observations was discovered. The autoregressive model failed to produce a
large systematic prediction error.
No evidence to support the hypotheses that revenues or deductions have increased after the imple-
mentation of the reverse VAT was discovered. It does not mean that it has not happened. It simply
means that this model produced no evidence to support this hypothesis. Third-party reporting could
decrease tax avoidance among companies just as it has done among private individuals (Kleven et al.
2011). Third party reporting in this case is related to declaring and paying the tax.
8 Conclusion
I introduced the concept of the shadow economy and why economists should be concerned both with
the phenomenon itself and the available estimates that may influence economic policy. Some studies
have painted a picture of a large shadow economy in Finland. Many of these estimates are produced
with methods that have problems with initial conditions and unrealistic assumptions. Indirect methods
should generally be avoided based on the critique.
The shadow economy can clearly have negative impacts on the national economy. These impacts are
related to crime, labour market participation, and potential loss of tax revenue. However these impacts
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should not be overestimated.
Recent RA-GAP estimates suggest that unassessed revenue in Finland currently lies somewhere be-
tween 1% and 3% of GDP. This estimate provides more evidence to contradict the large estimates
produced with macro methods such as the currency method. If the unassessed VAT of Finland is small
it follows that the unassessed taxable revenue must be small as well. The amount of shadow economy
added to the Finnish national accounts is roughly in line with the RA-GAP estimate.
Together with an estimate of illegal production the RA-GAP suggests that the shadow economy of
Finland is less than 2 % of GDP. Note that no intermediate products have been subtracted from the
unassessed revenue estimate. The possible subtraction would make the estimate even smaller.
Based on the evidence and literature presented assigning significant resources to fight the shadow
economy is likely not economical. The cost of further decreasing the compliance gap may be very high
and the same applies to the shadow economy as well.
In addition discussion on the shadow economy and issues such as hiding capital gains and transfer
pricing should be separated. They are different phenomena and the appropriate policy measures are
likely different.
With regards to the reverse VAT it is plausible that it has had some effect on reported revenue or
deductions. However studying the effect of a policy change when the variables of interest are unobserved
is difficult. In the end the estimated ARX(p) and AR(p )models fail to provide evidence to support
either hypothesis 1 or hypothesis 2 in any of the three industries.
The role of information was discussed in the literature review. Kosonen and Ropponen (2013) argue
that providing additional information can help decrease tax noncompliance at a relatively low cost.
Recent literature suggests that increasing third party reporting along with providing taxpayers with
additional information may be a cost-effective way to decrease the shadow economy.
Vero has estimated that the reverse VAT has brought in 75 million euro in increased tax revenue due
to a decrease in tax debts. The construction industry has been estimated to be the largest source of
tax noncompliance in Finland. This finding indicates that even in construction the shadow economy
appears to be small. And if the shadow economy is small in an industry with a high gross output and
compliance gap, it could indicate that the shadow economy is small in other industries as well.
In the upcoming years Vero will increase the amount of random audits to 500 and they are being
performed at small-and-medium sized enterprises (SMEs). However presumably there will be a very
limited number of random audits for each industry. This means that the data most likely cannot be
used to estimate the shadow economy by industry.
Thus resources in shadow economy research should in my view be directed to using operational audit
data. The data flow from tax audits is continuous and there is a methodology for using it. The problem
with using this methodology lies in the fact that this data is not easily available as it contains sensitive
information on companies.
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10 Appendix
Table 18: The compliance gap in billions of euros by industry
A-B C D-E F G-H I
2008 0.387422 0 0.387422 0.774844 -0.193711 0.193711
2009 0.181029 0.181029 0.362058 0.543087 0 0.362058
2010 0.1871 -0.1871 0.3742 0.5613 0.1871 0
2011 0.196869 -0.196869 0.196869 0.393738 0.393738 0
2012 0.199793 0.199793 0 0.399586 0.199793 0
2013 0.202743 0.810972 0.202743 0.405486 -0.202743 0
2014 0.205178 0.410356 0.205178 0.410356 -0.205178 0
J K-L M-N O-Q R-S
2008 -0.193711 0.387422 0.193711 0 2.745531
2009 -0.181029 0.181029 0.181029 0 3.085609
2010 -0.3742 0.1871 0 0 0
2011 -0.196869 0.196869 0 -0.196869 3.104063
2012 -0.199793 0.199793 -0.199793 -0.199793 3.127302
2013 0 0.202743 -0.202743 -0.202743 0
2014 0 0.205178 -0.205178 -0.205178 0
46
Table 19: Unassessed revenue estimated from the compliance gap
A-B C D-E F G-H I
2008 1.761009091 0 1.761009091 3.522018182 -0.8805045 0.8805045
2009 0.822859091 0.822859091 1.645718182 2.468577273 0 1.6457181
2010 0.831966403 -0.831966403 1.663932806 2.495899209 0.831966403 0
2011 0.855952174 -0.855952174 0.855952174 1.711904348 1.711904348 0
2012 0.868665217 0.868665217 0 1.737330435 0.868665217 0
2013 0.8447625 3.37905 0.8447625 1.689525 -0.8447625 0
2014 0.854908333 1.709816667 0.854908333 1.709816667 -0.854908333 0
J K-L M-N O-Q R-S
2008 -0-880504545 1.761009091 0.880504545 0 0
2009 -0.822859091 0.822859091 0.822859091 0 0
2010 -1.663932806 0.831966403 0 0 0
2011 -0.855952174 0.855952174 0 -0.855952174 0
2012 -0.868665217 0.868665217 -0.868665217 -0.868665217 0
2013 0 0.8447625 -0.8447625 -0.8447625 0
2014 0 0.854908333 -0.854908333 -0.854908333 0
47
Table 20: The Standard Industrial Classification TOL 2008
Industry Classification as based on the Standard Industrial Classification TOL 2008.
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing (01-03 )
B Mining and quarrying (05-09)
C Manufacturing (10-33)
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (35)
E Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (36-39)
F Construction (41-43)
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (45-47)
H Transportation and storage (49-54)
I Accommodation and food service activities (55-56)
J Information and communication (58-63)
K Financial and insurance activities (64-66)
L Real estate activities (68)
M Professional, scientific and technical activities (69-75)
N Administrative and support service activities (77-82)
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security (84)
P Education (85)
Q Human health and social work activities (86-88)
R Arts, entertainment and recreation (90-93)
S Other service activities (94-96)
T Activities of households as employers (97-98)
U Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies (99)
X Industry unknown (00)
48
Table 21: Added hidden production by industry
Top level Industry Added hidden production in 2014
A 022 0.04
B 081 0.05
B 089 0.05
C 331 0.04
C 332 0.02
E 383 0.1
E 390 0.1
F 411 0.05
F 42 + 431 0.05
H 4931 + 4939 0.0013
H 4932 0.02
H 494 0.041
H 522 0.005
H 53 0.02
I 55 0.03
I 56 0.05
J 58 0.01
J 59 60 0.05
J 61 0.01
J 62 63 0.01
L 681 + 68209 0.07
L 6831 0.08
L 6832 0.05
M 69 0.03
M 701 0.01
M 702 0.02
M 71 0.02
M 72 0.02
M 73 0.02
M 74 0.02
N 77 0.02
N 78 0.01
N 79 0.02
N 80 0.02
N 81 0.01
P 85 0.03
Q 86 0.01
R 90 91 0.02
R 93 0.1
S 95 0.1
S 9602 9609 0.01
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Regression 1
The VARMAX Procedure n=156 42+431
Number o f Observat ions 156
Number o f Pa i rwi se Miss ing 0
Simple Summary S t a t i s t i c s
Standard
Var iab le Type N Mean Deviat ion
Min Max
l o g l k v Dependent 156 19.69077 0.42448 18.48916
20.43086
l o g p a l k a t Independent 156 17.99872 0 .3138 e1 17.07147
18.55971
dummy Independent 156 0.06410 0.24572 0.00000
1.00000
Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
l o g l k v Zero Mean 0 .08 0 .7013 0 .65 0 .8552
S i n g l e Mean −25.01 0 .0026 −3.82 0 .0034
Trend −61.86 0 .0005 −5.76 <.0001
Seasona l ( Nseason=12) Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
l o g l k v Zero Mean 0 .78 0 .6078 3 .60 0 .9998
S i n g l e Mean −20.62 0 .0095 −3.79 0 .0005
Type o f Model ARX(3 ,1 )
Est imation Method Least Squares Est imation
Model Parameter Est imates n=156 42+431
Standard
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Equation Parameter Estimate Error t Value Pr > | t |
Var iab le
l o g l k v CONST1 0.18209 0.39226 0 .46 0 .6433
1
SD 1 1 −0.03780 0.05709 −0.66 0 .5090 S 1t
SD 1 2 0.27858 0.05734 4 .86 0 .0001 S 2t
SD 1 3 0.46603 0.05093 9 .15 0 .0001 S 3t
SD 1 4 0.63832 0.05671 11 .26 0 .0001 S 4t
SD 1 5 0.76386 0.06318 12 .09 0 .0001 S 5t
SD 1 6 0.55943 0.06802 8 .22 0 .0001 S 6t
SD 1 7 0.59603 0.04643 12 .84 0 .0001 S 7t
SD 1 8 0.51750 0.03398 15 .23 0 .0001 S 8t
SD 1 9 0.47081 0.03742 12 .58 0 .0001 S 9t
SD 1 10 0.33747 0.03388 9 .96 0 .0001 S 10t
SD 1 11 0.39499 0.03860 10 .23 0 .0001 S 11t
XL0 1 1 0.48924 0.10444 4 .68 0 .0001 l o g p a l k a t ( t )
XL0 1 2 0.11967 0.07049 1 .70 0 .0919 dummy( t )
XL1 1 1 −0.38180 0.10532 −3.63 0 .0004 l o g p a l k a t ( t−1)
XL1 1 2 −0.10956 0.07420 −1.48 0 .1422 dummy( t−1)
AR1 1 1 0.17172 0.08076 2 .13 0 .0353 l o g l k v ( t−1)
AR2 1 1 0.42809 0.07788 5 .50 0 .0001 l o g l k v ( t−2)
AR3 1 1 0.27216 0.07649 3 .56 0 .0005 l o g l k v ( t−3)
Variance Estimate f o r the Innovat ion
l o g l k v
0.00446
Informat ion
C r i t e r i a
AICC −5.26261
HQC −5.14496
AIC −5.29783
SBC −4.9215
FPEC 0.005009
Roots o f AR C h a r a c t e r i s t i c Polynomial
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Index Real Imaginary Modulus Radian Degree
1 0 .93774 0.00000 0 .9377 0 .0000 0 .0000
2 −0.38301 0.37886 0 .5387 2 .3616 135.3123
3 −0.38301 −0.37886 0 .5387 −2.3616 −135.3123
Regression 2
The VARMAX Procedure
Number o f Observat ions 156
Number o f Pa i rwi se Miss ing 0
Simple Summary S t a t i s t i c s
Standard
Var iab le Type N Mean Deviat ion
Min Max
log vahennykset Dependent 156 17.76826 0.43709 16.57589
18.58766
l o g p a l k a t Independent 156 17.99872 0.31381 17.07147
18.55971
dummy Independent 156 0.06410 0.24572 0.00000
1.00000
Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
log vahennykset Zero Mean 0 .10 0 .7050 0 .81 0 .8859
S i n g l e Mean −16.50 0 .0242 −3.06 0 .0320
Trend −65.68 0 .0005 −5.87 <.0001
Seasona l ( Nseason=12) Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
log vahennykset Zero Mean 1 .15 0 .6363 3 .32 0 .9996
S i n g l e Mean −19.49 0 .0121 −3.31 0 .0021
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Type o f Model ARX(2 ,0 )
Est imation Method Least Squares Est imation
Model Parameter Est imates
Standard
Equation Parameter Estimate Error t Value Pr > | t | Var iab le
log vahennykset CONST1 −1.02238 0.50522 −2.02 0 .0449 1
SD 1 1 0.27325 0.06090 4 .49 0 .0001 S 1t
SD 1 2 0.57188 0.04685 12 .21 0 .0001 S 2t
SD 1 3 0.50270 0.04075 12 .34 0 .0001 S 3t
SD 1 4 0.62755 0.04078 15 .39 0 .0001 S 4t
SD 1 5 0.62270 0.04556 13 .67 0 .0001 S 5t
SD 1 6 0.42462 0.04435 9 .57 0 .0001 S 6t
SD 1 7 0.46299 0.03661 12 .65 0 .0001 S 7t
SD 1 8 0.48455 0.03418 14 .17 0 .0001 S 8t
SD 1 9 0.45398 0.03342 13 .58 0 .0001 S 9t
SD 1 10 0.33644 0.03315 10 .15 0 .0001 S 10t
SD 1 11 0.48688 0.03897 12 .49 0 .0001 S 11t
XL0 1 1 0.24122 0.08150 2 .96 0 .0036 l o g p a l k a t ( t )
XL0 1 2 0.05077 0.02748 1 .85 0 .0668 dummy( t )
AR1 1 1 0.50291 0.08704 5 .78 0 .0001 log vahennykset ( t−1)
AR2 1 1 0.28604 0.07921 3 .61 0 .0004 log vahennykset ( t−2)
Variance Estimate f o r the Innovat ion
log vahennykset
0 .00585
Informat ion C r i t e r i a
AICC −5.01952
HQC −4.91545
AIC −5.04362
SBC −4.72809
FPEC 0.006455
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Roots o f AR C h a r a c t e r i s t i c Polynomial
Index Real Imaginary Modulus Radian Degree
1 0 .84244 0.00000 0 .8424 0 .0000 0 .0000
2 −0.33953 0.00000 0 .3395 3 .1416 180.0000
Regression 3
The VARMAX Procedure
Number o f Observat ions 156
Number o f Pa i rwi se Miss ing 0
Simple Summary S t a t i s t i c s
Standard
Var iab le Type N Mean Deviat ion
Min Max
l o g l k v Dependent 156 20.85821 0.28607 20.05450
21.47169
l o g p a l k a t Independent 156 19.21836 0.26502 18.57180
19.79640
dummy Independent 156 0.06410 0.24572 0.00000
1.00000
Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
l o g l k v Zero Mean 0 .06 0 .6953 0 .81 0 .8856
S i n g l e Mean −18.55 0 .0141 −3.13 0 .0270
Trend −74.73 0 .0005 −6.15 <.0001
Seasona l ( Nseason=12) Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
l o g l k v Zero Mean 0 .51 0 .5869 3 .00 0 .9988
S i n g l e Mean −23.24 0 .0057 −3.45 0 .0013
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Type o f Model ARX(3 ,0 )
Est imation Method Least Squares Est imation
Model Parameter Est imates n=156 4 1 2 +432 439
Standard
Equation Parameter Estimate Error t Value Pr > | t |
Var iab le
l o g l k v CONST1 0.61363 0.52049 1 .18 0 .2405
1
SD 1 1 0.07011 0.04947 1 .42 0 .1587 S 1t
SD 1 2 0.32533 0.04924 6 .61 0 .0001 S 2t
SD 1 3 0.36579 0.04360 8 .39 0 .0001 S 3t
SD 1 4 0.40097 0.04369 9 .18 0 .0001 S 4t
SD 1 5 0.42386 0.05390 7 .86 0 .0001 S 5t
SD 1 6 0.26606 0.04494 5 .92 0 .0001 S 6t
SD 1 7 0.34157 0.03941 8 .67 0 .0001 S 7t
SD 1 8 0.38768 0.03435 11 .28 0 .0001 S 8t
SD 1 9 0.46039 0.03607 12 .76 0 .0001 S 9t
SD 1 10 0.36864 0.03032 12 .16 0 .0001 S 10t
SD 1 11 0.37529 0.03733 10 .05 0 .0001 S 11t
XL0 1 1 0.29044 0.08003 3 .63 0 .0004 l o g p a l k a t ( t )
XL0 1 2 0.01657 0.02356 0 .70 0 .4831 dummy( t )
AR1 1 1 0.03859 0.08579 0 .45 0 .6535 l o g l k v ( t−1)
AR2 1 1 0.35540 0.07079 5 .02 0 .0001 l o g l k v ( t−2)
AR3 1 1 0.29426 0.07843 3 .75 0 .0003 l o g l k v ( t−3)
Variance Estimate f o r the Innovat ion
l o g l k v
0.00415
Informat ion C r i t e r i a
AICC −5.35346
HQC −5.24446
AIC −5.38124
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SBC −5.04453
FPEC 0.004606
Roots o f AR C h a r a c t e r i s t i c Polynomial
Index Real Imaginary Modulus Radian Degree
1 0 .85574 0.00000 0 .8557 0 .0000 0 .0000
2 −0.40857 0.42063 0 .5864 2 .3417 134.1667
3 −0.40857 −0.42063 0 .5864 −2.3417 −134.1667
Regression 4
The VARMAX Procedure
Number o f Observat ions 156
Number o f Pa i rwi se Miss ing 0
Simple Summary S t a t i s t i c s
Standard
Var iab le Type N Mean Deviat ion
Min Max
log vahennykset Dependent 156 18.91523 0.30592 18.10149
19.52815
l o g p a l k a t Independent 156 19.21836 0.26502 18.57180
19.79640
dummy Independent 156 0.06410 0.24572 0.00000
1.00000
Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
log vahennykset Zero Mean 0 .07 0 .6973 0 .86 0 .8939
S i n g l e Mean −15.04 0 .0356 −2.83 0 .0570
Trend −71.01 0 .0005 −6.00 <.0001
56
Seasona l ( Nseason=12) Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
log vahennykset Zero Mean 0 .64 0 .5970 2 .61 0 .9963
S i n g l e Mean −27.80 0 .0024 −3.70 0 .0006
Type o f Model ARX(2 ,0 )
Est imation Method Least Squares Est imation
Model Parameter Est imates n=156 4 1 2 +432 439
Standard
Equation Parameter Estimate Error t Value Pr > | t | Var iab le
log vahennykset CONST1 −0.58028 0.52659 −1.10 0 .2724 1
SD 1 1 0.13623 0.04648 2 .93 0 .0040 S 1t
SD 1 2 0.39365 0.04543 8 .67 0 .0001 S 2t
SD 1 3 0.28086 0.03859 7 .28 0 .0001 S 3t
SD 1 4 0.34905 0.03895 8 .96 0 .0001 S 4t
SD 1 5 0.34035 0.05303 6 .42 0 .0001 S 5t
SD 1 6 0.14200 0.03930 3 .61 0 .0004 S 6t
SD 1 7 0.28276 0.03803 7 .44 0 .0001 S 7t
SD 1 8 0.37086 0.03626 10 .23 0 .0001 S 8t
SD 1 9 0.37903 0.03311 11 .45 0 .0001 S 9t
SD 1 10 0.29721 0.03023 9 .83 0 .0001 S 10t
SD 1 11 0.24763 0.03684 6 .72 0 .0001 S 11t
XL0 1 1 0.33761 0.08844 3 .82 0 .0002 l o g p a l k a t ( t )
XL0 1 2 0.02385 0.02573 0 .93 0 .3555 dummy( t )
AR1 1 1 0.26055 0.08973 2 .90 0 .0043 log vahennykset ( t−1)
AR2 1 1 0.41323 0.07270 5 .68 0 .0001 log vahennykset ( t−2)
Variance Estimate f o r the Innovat ion
log vahennykset
0 .00502
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In format ion C r i t e r i a
AICC −5.17309
HQC −5.06902
AIC −5.19718
SBC −4.88166
FPEC 0.005536
Roots o f AR C h a r a c t e r i s t i c Polynomial
Index Real Imaginary Modulus Radian Degree
1 0 .78617 0.00000 0 .7862 0 .0000 0 .0000
2 −0.52562 0.00000 0 .5256 3 .1416 180.0000
Regression 5
The VARMAX Procedure
Number o f Observat ions 156
Number o f Pa i rwi se Miss ing 0
Simple Summary S t a t i s t i c s
Standard
Var iab le Type N Mean Deviat ion
Min Max
l o g l k v Dependent 156 16.53716 0.48125 15.35645
17.60810
l o g p a l k a t Independent 156 14.76022 0.23111 14.17426
15.29358
dummy Independent 156 0.06410 0.24572 0.00000
1.00000
Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
l o g l k v Zero Mean 0 .08 0 .6994 0 .51 0 .8251
58
S i n g l e Mean −18.61 0 .0139 −3.25 0 .0193
Trend −49.79 0 .0005 −5.00 0 .0004
Seasona l ( Nseason=12) Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
l o g l k v Zero Mean 0 .63 0 .5963 1 .51 0 .9465
S i n g l e Mean −48.14 0 .0023 −6.09 <.0001
The VARMAX Procedure
Type o f Model ARX(2 ,0 )
Est imation Method Least Squares Est imation
Model Parameter Est imates n=156 411
Standard
Equation Parameter Estimate Error t Value Pr > | t |
Var iab le
l o g l k v CONST1 −5.17674 1.23214 −4.20 0 .0001
1
SD 1 1 0.32901 0.10355 3 .18 0 .0018 S 1t
SD 1 2 0.42759 0.08809 4 .85 0 .0001 S 2t
SD 1 3 0.45222 0.08410 5 .38 0 .0001 S 3t
SD 1 4 0.34271 0.07817 4 .38 0 .0001 S 4t
SD 1 5 0.45102 0.09688 4 .66 0 .0001 S 5t
SD 1 6 −0.01245 0.08112 −0.15 0 .8782 S 6t
SD 1 7 0.40386 0.09606 4 .20 0 .0001 S 7t
SD 1 8 0.51931 0.07994 6 .50 0 .0001 S 8t
SD 1 9 0.42471 0.07611 5 .58 0 .0001 S 9t
SD 1 10 0.47575 0.07670 6 .20 0 .0001 S 10t
SD 1 11 0.66293 0.08762 7 .57 0 .0001 S 11t
XL0 1 1 0.89024 0.16582 5 .37 0 .0001 l o g p a l k a t ( t )
XL0 1 2 0.01721 0.05636 0 .31 0 .7605 dummy( t )
AR1 1 1 0.29678 0.08094 3 .67 0 .0003 l o g l k v ( t−1)
AR2 1 1 0.19947 0.08003 2 .49 0 .0139 l o g l k v ( t−2)
Variance Estimate f o r the Innovat ion
59
l o g l k v
0.02855
Informat ion C r i t e r i a
AICC −3.43385
HQC −3.32977
AIC −3.45794
SBC −3.14241
FPEC 0.031518
Roots o f AR C h a r a c t e r i s t i c Polynomial
Index Real Imaginary Modulus Radian Degree
1 0 .61902 0.00000 0 .6190 0 .0000 0 .0000
2 −0.32224 0.00000 0 .3222 3 .1416 180.0000
Regression 6
The VARMAX Procedure
Number o f Observat ions 156
Number o f Pa i rwi se Miss ing 0
Simple Summary S t a t i s t i c s
Standard
Var iab le Type N Mean Deviat ion
Min Max
log vahennykset Dependent 156 14.77671 0.54082 13.50222
15.83665
l o g p a l k a t Independent 156 14.76022 0.23111 14.17426
15.29358
dummy Independent 156 0.06410 0.24572 0.00000
1.00000
Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
60
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
log vahennykset Zero Mean 0 .10 0 .7044 0 .55 0 .8347
S i n g l e Mean −15.79 0 .0293 −2.99 0 .0384
Trend −42.74 0 .0005 −4.64 0 .0013
Seasona l ( Nseason=12) Dickey−F u l l e r Unit Root Tests
Var iab le Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau
log vahennykset Zero Mean 0 .59 0 .5935 0 .84 0 .8302
S i n g l e Mean −44.32 0 .0023 −5.19 <.0001
Type o f Model ARX(2 ,0 )
Est imation Method Least Squares Est imation
Model Parameter Est imates n=156 411
Standard
Equation Parameter Estimate Error t Value Pr > | t | Var iab le
log vahennykset CONST1 −7.88384 1.60582 −4.91 0 .0001 1
SD 1 1 0.21798 0.10397 2 .10 0 .0379 S 1t
SD 1 2 0.40945 0.09471 4 .32 0 .0001 S 2t
SD 1 3 0.37725 0.09037 4 .17 0 .0001 S 3t
SD 1 4 0.29273 0.08553 3 .42 0 .0008 S 4t
SD 1 5 0.39134 0.10597 3 .69 0 .0003 S 5t
SD 1 6 0.02064 0.08961 0 .23 0 .8181 S 6t
SD 1 7 0.34647 0.09639 3 .59 0 .0005 S 7t
SD 1 8 0.55628 0.08459 6 .58 0 .0001 S 8t
SD 1 9 0.35821 0.07950 4 .51 0 .0001 S 9t
SD 1 10 0.48815 0.08271 5 .90 0 .0001 S 10t
SD 1 11 0.60477 0.09279 6 .52 0 .0001 S 11t
XL0 1 1 0.99904 0.18348 5 .45 0 .0001 l o g p a l k a t ( t )
XL0 1 2 0.04479 0.06160 0 .73 0 .4684 dummy( t )
AR1 1 1 0.27385 0.07951 3 .44 0 .0008 log vahennykset ( t−1)
AR2 1 1 0.23920 0.07795 3 .07 0 .0026 log vahennykset ( t−2)
Variance Estimate f o r the Innovat ion
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l og vahennykset
0 .03348
I n f o r m a t i o n C r i t e r i a
AICC −3.27467
HQC −3.1706
AIC −3.29877
SBC −2.98324
FPEC 0.036957
Roots o f AR C h a r a c t e r i s t i c Polynomial
Index Real Imaginary Modulus Radian Degree
1 0 .64481 0.00000 0 .6448 0 .0000 0 .0000
2 −0.37096 0.00000 0 .3710 3 .1416 180.0000
Figure 24: Diagnostics 1. revenue in 42+431
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Figure 25: Diagnostics 2. revenue in 412 + 432 439
Figure 26: Diagnostis 3. revenue in 411
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Send completed form to:
FINNISH TAX ADMINISTRATION
PO Box  5000
00053 VERO
PERIODIC TAX RETURN K
If making corrections to an earlier 
filing, please only submit difference 
amounts instead of full amounts.
Do not send any enclosures with 
the Periodic tax return form.
Taxpayer's name (Name of VAT payer, Name of employer) 010 Business ID or personal identity number
VALUE ADDED TAX EMPLOYERS' CONTRIBUTIONS
050 Reporting frequency050 Reporting frequency 052 Period in question 053 Year 052 Period in question 053 Year
Month Monthly QuarterlyQuarter Year46
euro cents euro cents
Tax on domestic sales by tax rate
601 Wages/other compensation 
subject to withholding301 24 % tax
602 Tax withheld302 14 % tax
605 Wages/other payments 
subject to tax at source303 10 % tax
305 Tax on goods purchased from 
other EU Member States
606 Tax at source on wages/ 
other payments
306 Tax on services purchased 
from other EU Member States
609 Wages subject to social 
security contribution
610 Social security contribution 
payableTax on construction services 
purchased (reverse charge)
318
Period of no wage payments
054 056 307 Tax deductible for period 
in question
Period- 
start
Period-
end055 Year 057 Year
K
317 Amount of VAT relief
Tax payable /
Negative tax that qualifies 
for refund (-)
308
309 Sales taxable at 
zero VAT rate
311 Sales of goods to other 
EU Member States
312 Sales of services toother 
EU Member States
313 Purchases of goods from 
other EU Member States
314 Purchases of services from 
other EU Member States
319 Sales of construction services
(reverse charge)
For taxpayers within VAT relief scheme
euro cents
Purchases of construction 
services (reverse charge)
320
315 Sales that qualify for VAT reliefNo VAT activity
Period- 
start
Period- 
end
054 056 055 Year 057 Year Tax that qualifies for VAT relief316
Amount of VAT relief 
(transfer to line 317)
Date Signature and printed name 042 Telephone
VEROH 4001e/1  1.2016
K
Send completed form to:
FINNISH TAX ADMINISTRATION
PO Box  5000
00053 VERO
PERIODIC TAX RETURN (page 2) M
If making corrections to an earlier filing, 
please only submit difference amounts 
instead of full amounts.
Do not send any enclosures with the Periodic tax return form.
Taxpayer's name 010 Business ID or personal identity number
TAX RETURN FOR OTHER UN-PROMPTED TAXES
Please enter type of tax (code numbers from list below), reporting frequency, taxable period in question, 
year, and amount of tax payable.46
10
16
24
25
68
92
39
69
84
Lottery tax
Tax on insurance premiums
Amount withheld from purchase price for timber
Amount withheld from payment to limited company, cooperative or other corporation
Amount withheld from interest paid out
Amount withheld from dividends, and distributions of profit surplus by a cooperative 
Tax at source withheld from dividends (paid out to nonresidents)
Tax at source withheld from interest and royalties (paid out to nonresidents)
Tax at source withheld from interest income (of residents)
050 Reporting frequency060 Tax type code 052 Period in question 053 Year 061 Amount of tax payable
euro cents
Monthly QuarterlyM
Monthly Quarterly
Monthly Quarterly
Monthly Quarterly
Monthly Quarterly
For taxpayers of tax on insurance premiums (vakuutusmaksuvero):
No-activity period of business subject to insurance-premium tax
054 056 Period- 
start
Period- 
end055 Year 057 Year
Date Signature and printed name 042 Telephone
VEROH 4001e/2  1.2016
M
